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THE EXPERIENTIAL FUTURE OF THE LAW 
Adam J. Kolber* 
ABSTRACT 
Pain, suffering, anxiety, and other experiences are fundamentally 
important to civil and criminal law.  Despite their importance, we have limited 
ability to measure experiences, even though legal proceedings turn on such 
measurements every day.  Fortunately, technological advances in neuroscience 
are improving our ability to measure experiences and will do so more 
dramatically in what I call “the experiential future.” 
In this Article, I describe how new technologies will improve our 
assessments of physical pain, emotional distress, and a variety of psychiatric 
disorders.  I also describe more particular techniques to help determine 
whether: (1) a patient is in a persistent vegetative state, (2) a placebo 
treatment relieves pain, (3) an alleged victim has been abused as a child, (4) 
an inmate being executed is in pain, (5) an interrogatee has been tortured, and 
more.  I argue that as new technologies emerge to better reveal people’s 
experiences, virtually every area of the law should do more to take these 
experiences into account. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Subjective experience is fundamentally important to the law.  We craft laws 
to make us feel happier and safer and help us avoid conflicts that cause misery 
and grief.  When conflicts inevitably arise, litigants frequently claim that they 
have been wrongfully made to feel pain, sadness, fear, or anxiety.  The 
outcomes of legal adjudication can also cause negative experiences, as when 
courts issue injunctions or sentence offenders to prison.  There are few 
generalizations that apply to the law as a whole, but one is that virtually every 
aspect of the law affects people’s feelings, emotions, and other experiences. 
Though our experiences are critically important to the law, they cannot be 
observed directly.  People try to express their feelings and emotions, but we are 
suspicious of their claims, especially when they have financial incentives to lie 
or exaggerate.  Even when speaking truthfully, the nature and intensity of 
one’s feelings are very difficult to convey.  Despite our limited ability to judge 
the experiences of others, legal proceedings turn on such judgments every day. 
Fortunately, technological advances in neuroscience are beginning to 
provide more accurate methods of measuring experiences.  In 2007, I described 
how, in principle, brain imaging techniques could be used to more objectively 
assess a litigant’s pain.1  One year later, a patent was granted on an alleged 
method of using brain imaging to measure pain.2  During that same year, brain 
imaging evidence of pain was readied for battle in a worker’s compensation 
dispute, though the case settled soon thereafter.3  In early 2010, the Applied 
fMRI Institute became the first commercial enterprise to offer brain scanning 
services to assess pain.4  And pain is just one of the many experiences, like 
 
 1 Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433 
(2007) [hereinafter Kolber, Pain Detection]; see also Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and 
Property: Some Possible Legal and Social Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND 
THE LAW 114, 141–42 (Brent Garland ed., 2004) (noting the possibility that neuroimaging could help assess 
pain). 
 2 Objective Determinations of Chronic Pain in Patients, U.S. Patent No. 7,462,155 B2 (filed Oct. 27, 
2004) (issued Dec. 9, 2008); see also Brenda Simon, Patent on Pain Detection?, LAW & BIOSCIENCES BLOG 
(Jan. 28, 2009), http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/2009/01/28/patent-on-pain-detection 
(discussing the patent). 
 3 Greg Miller, Brain Scans of Pain Raise Questions for the Law, 323 SCIENCE 195 (2009) (describing 
how parties sought expert witnesses to testify about fMRI evidence purportedly showing that an employee’s 
chemical burns caused him chronic pain). 
 4 At least, I am not aware of any other company that has previously offered such services.  See Services, 
APPLIED FMRI INSTITUTE, http://www.appliedfmri.org/services.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2011) [hereinafter 
APPLIED FMRI INSTITUTE].  Applied fMRI no longer advertises brain-based pain assessment on its website, id., 
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distress, depression, and anxiety, for which we are working to develop more 
objective measurements.  While there is much debate about when these 
technologies will be ready for courtroom use, litigants will no doubt seek to 
introduce such evidence in the near future. 
In this Article, I describe some of the ways in which new technologies are 
shifting the way we measure experiences and will continue to do so more 
dramatically over the next thirty years.  I discuss in general terms how new 
technologies may improve our assessments of physical pain, pain relief, 
emotional distress, and a variety of psychiatric disorders.  I also discuss more 
particular applications of such technologies to assess whether: (1) a patient is 
in a persistent vegetative state, (2) a placebo treatment relieves pain, (3) an 
alleged victim has been abused as a child, (4) an inmate being executed is in 
pain, (5) an interrogatee has been tortured, and others. 
My central claim is that as new technologies emerge to better reveal 
people’s experiences, the law ought to do more to take these experiences into 
account.  In tort and criminal law, we often ignore or downplay the importance 
of subjective experience.  This is no surprise.  During the hundreds of years in 
which these bodies of law developed, we had very poor methods of making 
inferences about the experiences of others.  As we get better at measuring 
experiences, however, I make the normative claim that we ought to change 
fundamental aspects of the law to take better account of people’s experiences. 
In Part I, “The Importance of Subjective Experience,” I briefly explain why 
subjective experience is so important to the law.  Indeed, if classical 
utilitarianism is correct, everything of value depends on subjective experience, 
and the law should help us maximize good experiences.  But even if classical 
utilitarians overstate the importance of subjective experience, the nature and 
quality of our experiences are undoubtedly critical to any account of what 
makes our lives valuable.  For the law to connect with the important aspects of 
our lives, it must attend to subjective experience. 
While some of the most exciting technologies to help us assess experiences 
are nowhere near ready for forensic use, in Part II, “The Experiential Present,” 
I describe some of the assessment technologies already available in our 
primitive experiential present.  For example, though we do not typically think 
 
but such assessments are now being marketed by Chronic Pain Diagnostics, Inc., see Pain Measurement 
Through Objective Testing, CHRONIC PAIN DIAGNOSTICS, INC., https://chronicpd.com/Home.html (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2011). 
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that an X-ray of a broken leg reveals subjective experience, it surely tells us 
something about a person’s pain.  Emerging technologies will enable us to 
make inferences about others’ experiences more frequently and with greater 
precision.  These technologies may never be perfect.  But they don’t have to 
be.  They need only be cost-effective supplements to the very crude methods 
we use today. 
In Part III, “The Experiential Future,” I argue that as better methods of 
measuring experiences emerge, they can and should revolutionize many areas 
of civil and criminal litigation.  In the tort context, this argument is easy to 
make.  Both current law and our best theories of tort law treat experiences like 
pain and suffering as generally relevant to damage assessments.  If we remain 
consistent with this prevailing view in the future, the content of the law should 
change in rather dramatic ways.  Instead of the rough proxy measures of 
experience that have become embedded in the law over many years, we can 
turn to new technologies that help us measure experience more directly. 
In criminal justice contexts, by contrast, there is a conflict between 
prevailing law and our best theories of why we punish offenders.  Prevailing 
law suggests that we can generally ignore victim and offender experiences or 
consider them to a very limited degree.  I will argue that prevailing law is 
misguided and inconsistent with our best efforts to justify punishment.  If we 
seek just punishment practices, then we must consider subjective experience 
more than we do now.  The experiential future will make it easier to measure 
both the amount of harm caused by crime perpetrators and the amount of 
punishment they should subsequently receive. 
Given the breadth of this Article, I can only scratch the surface of the many 
areas of the law that should change in the experiential future (and in many 
cases, I refer readers to more detailed discussion that I have provided 
elsewhere).  But this Article will paint a picture of what the future will look 
like if the law pays better attention to subjective experience, as I argue it 
should.  While dramatic technological advances are still some time away, 
thinking about our experiential future, I argue, can help us better understand 
and apply the law even today. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes famously remarked that “[t]he life of the law has 
not been logic: it has been experience.”5  Quite inadvertently, Holmes’s 
 
 5 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009) (1881).  Holmes argued 
that judges decide cases pragmatically and are influenced by their prejudices and life experiences.  Judges do 
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comment also applies to our experiential future, for the life of the law largely 
has been and will continue to be about measuring, monitoring, manipulating, 
permitting, and prohibiting certain experiences.  In the experiential future, we 
will have better measures of subjective experience and plenty of reason to 
revise the law to focus more directly and explicitly on those experiences. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE 
When crafting law, we implicitly make value judgments about the 
importance of subjective experience.  Consider two prominent views of tort 
law.  On one view, tort law promotes corrective justice.  Those who tortiously 
cause injury must compensate their victims to make them whole.6  To decide 
what it means to make a victim whole, we must make a value judgment.  If we 
require tortfeasors to compensate victims for their pain and suffering, we have 
implicitly decided that those experiences have disvalue. 
Alternatively, suppose that tort law is supposed to deter bad behavior.  If 
so, we seek to prohibit activities when their expected costs exceed their 
expected benefits.  We use tort law to encourage people to internalize the risks 
of harm they create by forcing them to pay for those harms should they arise.7  
To do this, we must decide what outcomes count as costs that must be 
internalized.  If we require tortfeasors to internalize the costs of the pain and 
suffering they cause, we have implicitly decided that those experiences have 
disvalue.  In other words, under some widely held views of tort law, we must 
decide whether or not experiential harms matter.8 
Classical utilitarians have a clear answer.  On their view, experiences are 
all that ultimately matter.  The good—that which is of value—consists in 
experiences like happiness and pleasure, while the bad—that which is of 
disvalue—consists in experiences like sadness and pain.9  To choose the 
morally correct action, including the right law or policy, we should try to 
 
not, as many theorists claimed, formalistically deduce outcomes in particular cases by applying case facts to 
the law.  See Moses J. Aronson, Book Review, 20 TEX. L. REV. 118 (1942) (reviewing MAX RADIN, LAW AS 
LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE (1940)) (discussing controversy over the proper interpretation of Holmes’s statement). 
 6 See David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 256, 271 (1989) (discussing the corrective justice rationale for tort law). 
 7 See, e.g., Ronen Perry, Re-Torts, 59 ALA. L. REV. 987, 990 (2008) (stating that, from an economic 
perspective, the primary objective of tort law is to deter behavior that unjustifiably risks causing harm). 
 8 I discuss these and other possible goals of tort law in more detail in Part III.A infra. 
 9 See, e.g., JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 7–8 
(1986); WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 13 (2d ed. 2002). 
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maximize net happiness or pleasure.  Though difficult to implement, the 
formula is extraordinarily generalizable, applying to everything we do.  If the 
classical utilitarian view is correct, nothing is more important to the law than 
experiences because all value depends on experiences.10 
Classical utilitarians may oversimplify our experiential palette.  We value 
other more complicated experiences like empathy, creativity, and spontaneity 
that are not easily categorized as kinds of happiness or pleasure.  But the core 
idea behind classical utilitarianism—that everything of value depends on our 
experiences—has substantial appeal.  Many of our life goals revolve around 
obtaining certain kinds of experiences.  For most of human history, daily life 
has been consumed with efforts to avoid the pains of hunger and thirst.  Even 
those who are well nourished strive to avoid chronic pain and emotional 
distress.  We cannot explain why these experiences are bad solely in terms of 
some other potential locus of disvalue, like a deprivation of liberty.  A solitary 
person can still have bad experiences, even when no one interferes with his 
liberty. 
By contrast, to enjoy anything, including some liberty, we must experience 
it.  That which is entirely outside our range of experiences cannot affect us, at 
least not in any way that we ever come to recognize.11  We cannot value 
liberties that no one is aware of; such liberties are only valuable, if at all, in a 
very impersonal way.  Perhaps nothing is of value without a person to value it, 
and some fact about the world that never enters conscious experience has no 
one to value it.  In a world without creatures that have experiences—a world of 
sophisticated but unfeeling robots, for example—we might think there is 
nothing of value at all. 
The idea that value consists solely of subjective experience has been 
sharply attacked, however.  Robert Nozick famously proposed a thought 
experiment intended to elicit the intuition that more things in fact matter to us 
 
 10 I am describing classical utilitarians as value hedonists rather than welfare hedonists.  Value hedonists 
believe that “pleasure is the only intrinsic good and pain the only intrinsic evil.”  SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE 
ETHICS 31 (1998).  Welfare hedonists believe that our well-being—the quality of our own lives—depends only 
on experiences, while acknowledging (contra value hedonists) that there are other forms of value in the world, 
like ethical value or the value of mathematical truths, that do not depend solely on experiences.  See id. 
 11 See JAMES HILLMAN & MICHAEL VENTURA, WE’VE HAD A HUNDRED YEARS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND 
THE WORLD’S GETTING WORSE 62 (1993) (“[W]hat we are really, and the reality we live, is our psychic 
reality . . . .”); John Bronsteen et al., Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1594–95 (2010). 
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than just experiences.12  Nozick asked us to imagine being connected to a 
machine that can give us any set of experiences we want: 
Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any 
experience you desired.  Superduper neuropsychologists could 
stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were 
writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting 
book.  All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes 
attached to your brain.  Should you plug into this machine for life, 
preprogramming your life’s experiences?13 
Before we answer, Nozick put aside some concerns that are not relevant to the 
thought experiment: 
If you are worried about missing out on desirable experiences, we can 
suppose that business enterprises have researched thoroughly the 
lives of many others.  You can pick and choose from their large 
library or smorgasbord of such experiences, selecting your life’s 
experiences for, say, the next two years.  After two years have 
passed, you will have ten minutes or ten hours out of the tank, to 
select the experiences of your next two years.  Of course, while in the 
tank you won’t know that you’re there; you’ll think it’s all actually 
happening.  Others can also plug in to have the experiences they 
want, so there’s no need to stay unplugged to serve them.14 
Despite the machine’s ability to give us whatever experiences we might want, 
Nozick argued that we would not plug in to it.  According to Nozick, the fact 
that we would not connect is evidence that we in fact value more things than 
just experiences.  “Perhaps what we desire,” he claimed, “is to live . . . in 
contact with reality.”15 
Nozick’s thought experiment is widely treated as a thorough refutation of 
the view that experiential states are all that matter.16  As I have argued 
elsewhere,17 however, the thought experiment is hardly so successful.  Even if 
 
 12 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42–45 (1974).  Nozick’s thought experiment builds 
on a similar one proposed by J. J. C. Smart.  See J. J. C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in 
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 1, 19–22 (J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973). 
 13 Smart, supra note 12, at 42. 
 14 Id. at 42–43. 
 15 Id. at 45. 
 16 See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 13. 
 17 Adam Kolber, Mental Statism and the Experience Machine, BARD J. SOC. SCI., Winter 1994–95, at 10 
[hereinafter Kolber, Mental Statism]; see also Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical 
Implications of Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1605 n.226 (2006). 
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most people would say that they would not connect to an experience machine, 
we cannot necessarily treat such responses as reflecting people’s considered 
judgments.  In particular, we may be biased by the particular formulation of the 
thought experiment.  For example, people may simply prefer the set of 
experiences in the world that they currently inhabit over the set of experiences 
they anticipate having if they were connected to an experience machine.  Their 
intuitive reactions to the thought experiment may reflect a bias for our status 
quo experiences, rather than a deep, meaningful preference for the non-
experiential value of living in the real world. 
To illustrate our status quo bias, I have argued, we should consider the 
experience machine scenario in reverse, thereby switching the status quo.18  
Suppose that you were told that you are currently hooked up to an experience 
machine.  All of your friends and family do not really exist and all of your 
accomplishments up to this point never actually happened.  Instead, in the real 
world, you are someone else who has different friends, family, and 
accomplishments than you currently perceive yourself to have.  Moreover, you 
are told that your life in the real world has significantly worse experiences than 
your current life on the machine (otherwise you would not have connected in 
the first place).  Indeed, for all you know, you may in fact be connected to an 
experience machine right now.19  The revised formulation of the question is: 
would you disconnect if you believed that you were currently connected to an 
experience machine?20 
While most people share Nozick’s original intuition that they would not 
connect to the machine, far fewer would disconnect from a machine to which 
they were already connected.  Indeed, some recent work in experimental 
philosophy tested this intuition by asking subjects a reverse-experience-
machine question like the one I proposed.  Depending on how life off of the 
experience machine was described in the experiment, between 46% and 87% 
of subjects would remain connected to an experience machine.21  Given that 
many of us would remain connected to an experience machine to which we 
were already connected, Nozick’s original formulation of the thought 
experiment may elicit, at least to some extent, a preference for our status quo 
 
 18 Kolber, Mental Statism, supra note 17, at 15. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Felipe De Brigard, If You Like It, Does It Matter if It’s Real?, 23 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 43, 47–48 (2010). 
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mode of living rather than a considered judgment that more matters to us than 
just experiences. 
Still, even if Nozick’s thought experiment fails to clearly establish that we 
care about more than just subjective experience, we may indeed care about 
other things.  Robert Hare pointed out that we prefer to live in a world in which 
our spouses are faithful, even if we never discover their adultery and even if 
the adultery has no effect on our subjective experience.22  Once again, our 
intuitions in Hare’s example may be biased by the thought experiment or just 
be plain wrong, but it is very difficult to prove that experiences are all that 
matter. 
Importantly, however, nothing I will say about the experiential future 
depends on the claim that experiences are the only things that matter.  Though I 
have sought to show that subjective experience is very important to our lives, 
we may, rightly or wrongly, care about other things as well.  What is 
indisputable is that some experiences are valuable and some are disvaluable.  
As Shelly Kagan has stated, “[P]retty much everyone believes at least this 
much: the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain is at least one 
component of well-being.  (It is quite hard to deny this.  The value of pleasure 
and the disvalue of pain seem virtually self-evident to anyone experiencing 
them.)”23  Martha Nussbaum, for example, has offered a rather objective list of 
“functional capabilities” that she takes to be central to human life;24 still, many 
of the capabilities she lists are intimately connected to human experience, like 
“[n]ot having one’s emotional development blighted by overwhelming fear and 
anxiety, or by traumatic events of abuse or neglect.”25  Even deontologists 
must count experiences as sources of value or disvalue “if only to flesh out the 
‘duty of beneficence’ that is standardly included among the ‘right things’ to be 
 
 22 R. M. HARE, ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD 131 (1971). 
 23 KAGAN, supra note 10, at 30; see also Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Interpersonal 
Comparisons, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 17, 23 (Jon Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 
1991) (recognizing conscious states as among the things that are important to us); Peter Railton, Alienation, 
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 134, 149 (1984) (identifying 
“happiness, knowledge, purposeful activity, autonomy, solidarity, respect, and beauty” as “intrinsically” 
valuable); cf. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 4 (1984) (stating that, even for objective theories of self-
interest, “happiness and pleasure are at least part of what makes our lives go better for us, and misery and pain 
are at least part of what makes our lives go worse”). 
 24 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 78–80 
(2000). 
 25 Id. at 79. 
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done.”26  If subjective experience is even instrumentally relevant to one’s 
theory of the good, one cannot entirely ignore our experiential future. 
So long as pain and suffering are generally disvaluable (even if other things 
are disvaluable too), we must consider them when crafting law and 
adjudicating cases.  To return to the discussion of tort law, if tort law is 
supposed to promote corrective justice, defendants who tortiously cause pain 
and suffering must compensate plaintiffs for those bad experiences.  Similarly, 
if tort law is supposed to optimally deter bad activities, then defendants who 
risk excessive experiential harms must compensate plaintiffs for those bad 
experiences.27  Thus, on any prevailing view of tort law, subjective experience 
matters.  Of course, to the extent that measuring subjective experience in 
individual cases is impossible or cost prohibitive, we have to settle for second-
best solutions.  But as new technologies facilitate measurement, our second-
best solutions become less and less defensible. 
II. THE EXPERIENTIAL PRESENT 
We already have some technologies that help us assess the experiences of 
other people.  When we see an X-ray of a shattered leg, for example, we can 
generally infer that the person with the shattered leg was in great pain soon 
after his injury.  Traditional diagnostic imaging, however, provides only weak 
and inexact evidence about our experiences.  For example, many people with 
genuine back pain have no abnormal anatomical findings, while many people 
without back pain do show spine-related abnormalities.28 
While courts wrestled at first with decisions to admit diagnostic images,29 
today courts regularly admit X-rays, CT scans, and MRIs to provide insight 
into the extent of a person’s pain and suffering.30  Advances in imaging 
 
 26 Robert E. Goodin, Utility and the Good, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 241, 241 (Peter Singer ed., 1991). 
 27 To give people proper incentives, we should focus not on the actual harms they cause but on the harms 
they should have anticipated.  Nevertheless, our best evidence of what harms ought to have been expected will 
often depend on the actual harms that occur.  See infra Part III.A. 
 28 See Gina Kolata, With Costs Rising, Treating Back Pain Often Seems Futile, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2004, 
at A1 (noting a researcher’s claim that “[a] variety of studies have suggested that in 85 percent of cases it is 
impossible to say why a person’s back hurts”). 
 29 See Anthony R. Benedetto, Not Just “X-Rays” Today: Recommendations for Admissibility of Modern 
Radiology Images, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 113, 126–27 (2007); Stacey A. Tovino, Imaging Body Structure and 
Mapping Brain Function: A Historical Approach, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 193, 209–15 (2007). 
 30 See, e.g., Jack E. Hubbard & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., “Show Me the Pain”: Limitations and Pitfalls of 
Medical Imaging of the Low Back, 14 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 129 (2010) (describing a variety of diagnostic 
imaging tests that sometimes provide good evidence of low back pain). 
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technology may eventually provide far better evidence of people’s subjective 
states by focusing less on body tissue like bone and muscle and more on the 
brain, where we process most of the information related to our experiences.  In 
this Part, I briefly describe some of the technologies that can help us infer the 
experiences of other people. 
A. Measuring Physical Pain 
Experiences like pain are private in the following sense: I am a better 
authority on what I am immediately experiencing at a given moment than 
anyone else.31  I know how I am feeling through introspection, while others 
have to make inferences about my experiences based on my behavior or other 
indirect clues.  These inferences may be wrong.  A person who seems to be in 
pain may be lying to gain a favorable settlement or to avoid work obligations.  
Others, like stroke victims or young children, may be incapable of expressing 
their feelings.32 
Doctors and researchers have long sought to make more accurate 
assessments of pain.  For example, clinicians regularly ask patients to rate their 
pain on a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 is the worst pain imaginable.33  But two 
people who experience pain of the same intensity may nevertheless refer to 
their pain with different numbers.  Among other reasons, one patient may have 
a very vivid imagination about the worst pain imaginable and, therefore, 
 
 31 I call this the “Walking in Memphis” principle.  In a song of the same name, singer Marc Cohn asks, 
“[D]o I really feel the way I feel?”  MARC COHN, Walking in Memphis, on MARC COHN (Atlantic Records 
1991).  The answer is, “yes,” he really does feel the way he feels.  In fact, it is arguably impossible for it to be 
otherwise.  I discuss the topic of neuroscience and pain measurement in more detail in Kolber, Pain Detection, 
supra note 1. 
 32 We must nevertheless make judgments under uncertainty about the pain of creatures that cannot 
communicate.  For example, Nebraska controversially banned the abortion of fetuses at twenty weeks’ 
gestational age, citing a legislative finding that such fetuses may experience pain.  Pain-Capable Unborn Child 
Protection Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-3,104 (2010).  Even soon after we are born, there is disagreement about 
the nature of the pain we experience.  See, e.g., Janice Lander et al., Comparison of Ring Block, Dorsal Penile 
Nerve Block, and Topical Anesthesia for Neonatal Circumcision, 278 JAMA 2157, 2161 (1997) 
(recommending that newborns receive anesthesia prior to circumcision).  And, of course, there are continuing 
debates over the moral and legal significance of the pain of nonhuman animals.  See Adam Kolber, Note, 
Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes, 54 STAN. L. REV. 163, 182–88 
(2001) (describing Peter Singer’s view that we must give equal consideration to the interests of all creatures 
that experience pain).  All of these issues will be better informed in the experiential future. 
 33 See, e.g., PATRICK WALL, PAIN: THE SCIENCE OF SUFFERING 11–12 (2000); Eric Eich et al., Questions 
Concerning Pain, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 155, 162 (Daniel Kahneman 
et al. eds., 1999). 
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systematically rate his pain lower than someone else with a less vivid 
imagination. 
Despite the notorious difficulties of making intersubjective assessments of 
experience,34 we nevertheless make them every day.  When we observe a child 
cry, we infer that the child is in pain.  When we see a litigant laboriously 
hobble up to the witness stand, we infer that he is having difficulty moving or 
at least wants to seem that way.  If intersubjective experiential assessments 
were entirely impossible, we would be hard-pressed to justify our current tort 
practices. 
New technologies will never eliminate the difficulties of making 
intersubjective assessments.  In the future, however, our assessments of others’ 
experiences will improve.  In recent years, researchers have made tremendous 
strides in identifying neural correlates of the experience of pain.35  Some of 
these techniques use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of the 
brain, which is similar to the more familiar structural MRI of the brain that 
hospitals have been using for over twenty years.36  While structural MRI 
reveals brain anatomy, like whether a person has a tumor or signs of a head 
injury, fMRI reveals which portions of a person’s brain are especially active 
under particular conditions.37 
When imaging brain function in subjects experiencing pain, researchers 
observe increased activation in specific parts of the brain, including certain 
regions of the cortex.38  The amount of activation observed depends on the 
intensity of the pain.39  For example, one team of researchers had subjects 
 
 34 See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 9, at 106–24; Scanlon, supra note 23, at 17. 
 35 See, e.g., David Borsook & Lino Becerra, Functional Imaging of Pain and Analgesia—A Valid 
Diagnostic Tool?, 117 PAIN 247 (2005); Robert C. Coghill et al., Pain Intensity Processing Within the Human 
Brain: A Bilateral, Distributed Mechanism, 82 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 1934 (1999); E. A. Moulton et al., 
Regional Intensive and Temporal Patterns of Functional MRI Activation Distinguishing Noxious and 
Innocuous Contact Heat, 93 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 2183 (2005); Carlo A. Porro, Functional Imaging and 
Pain: Behavior, Perception, and Modulation, 9 NEUROSCIENTIST 354, 357 (2003); I. Tracey, Imaging Pain, 
101 BRIT. J. ANAESTHESIA 32 (2008). 
 36 See Hubbard & Hodge, supra note 30, at 149 (noting that MRI was approved by the FDA in 1986). 
 37 JAMIE WARD, THE STUDENT’S GUIDE TO COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 49–56 (2006). 
 38 See, e.g., Pierre Rainville et al., Pain Affect Encoded in Human Anterior Cingulate but Not 
Somatosensory Cortex, 277 SCIENCE 968, 969 (1997) (using positron emission tomography to support 
“previous findings of significant pain-related activations” in the primary and secondary somatosensory 
cortices, the rostral insula, and the anterior cingulate cortex); Tor D. Wager et al., Placebo-Induced Changes in 
fMRI in the Anticipation and Experience of Pain, 303 SCIENCE 1162, 1162 (2004) (“Pain responsive regions, 
or the ‘pain matrix,’ include thalamus, somatosensory cortex, insula, and anterior cingulate cortex.”). 
 39 See Coghill et al., supra note 35, at 1936; Porro, supra note 35, at 357. 
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touch a hot piece of metal and report the pain they experienced using a 1-to-10 
pain scale.40  Based on subjects’ self-reported pain, each subject was placed 
into a high, medium, or low pain sensitivity group.  Subjects were later 
exposed to the same heat stimulus during an fMRI scan.  Consistent with their 
self-reports, subjects in the high sensitivity group, on average, showed greater 
activation in the parts of the brain used to process pain than did the subjects in 
the low sensitivity group.41   
More recently, researchers have shown how the amount of brain activity in 
the insula closely correlates with the subjective pain reports of individual 
subjects.42  A team of researchers describing the work state that “the brain 
activity . . . in this insular region reflects the magnitude of subjective pain 
every time a participant[] indicates that individual’s perceived magnitude of 
pain, with a linear correlation between brain activity and magnitude of 
subjective perception.”43  That’s precisely the kind of work that may someday 
lead fMRI evidence of pain into the courtroom. 
While the research I have so far described focuses on acute pain, 
researchers have also used neuroimaging to identify structural changes in the 
brain associated with chronic pain.44  In a 2004 study, Vania Apkarian and 
colleagues used traditional MRI to identify structural differences in the brains 
of a group of people with chronic back pain compared to the brains of a group 
without back pain.45  On average, the group with chronic back pain had a lower 
volume of neocortical grey matter than did the pain-free group.46  Moreover, 
 
 40 Robert C. Coghill et al., Neural Correlates of Interindividual Differences in the Subjective Experience 
of Pain, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8538, 8538 (2003). 
 41 Id. at 8539–42. 
 42 See M. N. Baliki et al., Parsing Pain Perception Between Nociceptive Representation and Magnitude 
Estimation, 101 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 875, 880 fig.4 (2009). 
 43 A. Vania Apkarian et al., Pain and the Brain: Specificity and Plasticity of the Brain in Clinical 
Chronic Pain, 152 PAIN (SUPP. 3) S49, S50 (2011); see also Andre Marquand et al., Quantitative Prediction of 
Subjective Pain Intensity from Whole-Brain fMRI Data Using Gaussian Processes, 49 NEUROIMAGE 2178 
(2010) (using fMRI brain data and machine learning algorithms to predict the level of pain an individual 
subject will report from a painful stimulus). 
 44 See Karen D. Davis, Recent Advances and Future Prospects in Neuroimaging of Acute and Chronic 
Pain, 1 FUTURE NEUROLOGY 203 (2006); Arne May, Chronic Pain May Change the Structure of the Brain, 
137 PAIN 7, 12 (2008). 
 45 A. Vania Apkarian et al., Chronic Back Pain Is Associated with Decreased Prefrontal and Thalamic 
Gray Matter Density, 24 J. NEUROSCIENCE 10410, 10410–11 (2004). 
 46 Id. at 10410–13. 
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the study identified a positive relationship between how long subjects had 
chronic pain and how much brain volume they lost.47 
Perhaps most impressive, Apkarian and colleagues were recently able to 
distinguish a group of subjects with chronic back pain from a group of subjects 
without chronic back pain by examining how subjects responded to acute 
pain.48  When the groups were exposed to a painful heat stimulus, they had 
largely similar brain activity under fMRI.49  In one particular region of the 
brain, however, the nucleus accumbens, researchers found dramatically 
different responses to the cessation of the heat stimulus in back pain sufferers 
relative to healthy controls.50  The researchers claim that this signal 
“distinguishes the two groups at a very high rate of sensitivity and specificity, 
implying that this signal can be used as an objective marker of chronic pain.”51 
All of these techniques for measuring pain are at an early stage of 
development, however, and require further elaboration and replication.  Even 
though a number of researchers have patented neuroscientific methods of 
measuring pain,52 and fMRI pain evidence has begun to trickle into pretrial 
litigation,53 such technologies have numerous obstacles to overcome before 
they are ready for use in the clinic or the courtroom. 
 
 47 Id.; see also Paul Y. Geha et al., The Brain in Chronic CRPS Pain: Abnormal Gray-White Matter 
Interactions in Emotional and Autonomic Regions, 60 NEURON 570 (2008) (identifying structural differences 
in the brains of those with chronic regional pain syndrome). 
 48 Marwan N. Baliki et al., Predicting Value of Pain and Analgesia: Nucleus Accumbens Response to 
Noxious Stimuli Changes in the Presence of Chronic Pain, 66 NEURON 149, 149 (2010). 
 49 Id. at 151. 
 50 Id. at 151–53.  The researchers suspect that when chronic pain sufferers are exposed to acute pain, they 
are momentarily relieved of their chronic pain.  Because the cessation of acute pain leads to the return of 
chronic pain, the reward centers of their brains do not treat the cessation of acute pain as being rewarding in 
the same way that healthy subjects do.  Id. at 156–57.  Whatever the reason, so long as the difference can 
reliably be identified, we might someday be able to use fMRI to distinguish those with genuine chronic back 
pain from those without it. 
 51 Id. at 157; see also DONNA LLOYD ET AL., HEALTH & SAFETY EXEC., DEVELOPMENT OF FUNCTIONAL 
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (FMRI) TO MEASURE THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM RESPONSE TO 
CHRONIC BACK PAIN (2005), available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr394.pdf. 
 52 As noted, a patent was granted on a method of using functional magnetic resonance imaging to 
measure pain more objectively.  See ’155 Patent, supra note 2.  Other recent patents related to pain-assessment 
include: Assembly and Method for Objectively Measuring Pain in a Subject, U.S. Patent No. 6,018,675 (filed 
May 22, 1998) (issued Jan. 25, 2000), and Method and Apparatus for Objectively Measuring Pain, Pain 
Treatment and Other Related Techniques, U.S. Patent No. 6,907,280 (filed Mar. 30, 2001) (issued June 14, 
2005). 
 53 See Miller, supra note 3. 
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There are five major obstacles to using these emerging techniques to assess 
pain.  First, most—but not all—brain imaging research examines average 
features of a group of subjects relative to average features of another group.  In 
order to use brain imaging in forensic contexts, we ideally seek assessments of 
the experiences of particular people, not groups of people.  Second, individual 
brains vary quite a bit, and it is not yet clear whether we will be able to find 
distinct biological markers of pain that are good enough for the courtroom.  
Third, when looking at chronic pain and brain structure, we do not know if 
chronic pain causes changes in brain structure or whether those with particular 
brain structures are at greater risk of developing chronic pain.  Either way, the 
brain data might be useful in assessing whether a particular litigant has genuine 
pain.  But our inability to answer such basic questions reminds us that this 
research is still at an early stage.  Fourth, pain is multifaceted, having sensory, 
affective, and cognitive components.54  Pain can be caused by physical trauma 
or have psychogenic origins.55  For the foreseeable future, these brain imaging 
technologies are unlikely to recognize nuanced variations in pain affect and 
etiology.  Fifth, whatever technology is developed to detect malingered pain 
may be subject to countermeasures.  If people can easily cheat, the technique 
will not be useful in the courtroom.  Techniques that rely on functional brain 
imaging may be particularly susceptible to countermeasures because we have 
some control over our own brain activity.56  By contrast, tests that examine 
structural features of the brain will be much harder to fool. 
Though these techniques need considerable refinement, remember that we 
are not very good at assessing pain today.  We have poor data on rates of pain 
malingering,57 and we don’t know the error rates of pain assessments made by 
judges, jurors, doctors, and insurance examiners.  How can we even say that 
brain-based methods of pain assessment are worse than the ones we use now if 
we don’t know the error rates of our current assessment techniques?  In order 
for new technologies to inform our clinical and forensic assessments, they need 
 
 54 See Kolber, Pain Detection, supra note 1, at 436–37. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Compare R. Christopher deCharms et al., Control over Brain Activation and Pain Learned by Using 
Real-Time Functional MRI, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18626, 18626 (2005) (suggesting that, with training, 
we can develop some control over our acute pain and, hence, the way that our pain appears under fMRI), with 
Stuart W.G. Derbyshire et al., Cerebral Activation During Hypnotically Induced and Imagined Pain, 23 
NEUROIMAGE 392 (2004) (suggesting that, absent coaching, merely imagining pain will not appear the same 
under fMRI as actually experiencing pain). 
 57 See Kolber, Pain Detection, supra note 1, at 434 n.5 (citing some limited data on malingering). 
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only provide cost-effective ways of improving our current methods of pain 
assessment.  To do that, they hardly need to be perfect. 
B. “Mind Reading” Technologies 
New technologies will tell us about other experiences aside from just pain.  
Later on, I will discuss several such techniques as they relate to particular areas 
of the law.  For example, I will discuss epigenetic evidence of childhood abuse 
and adversity, electroencephalographic evidence of the anesthetic depth of 
those being executed, and a variety of methods of assessing emotional distress, 
including the extreme suffering associated with torture. 
There are also other methods of inferring people’s experiential states that 
could somewhat sensationally be called “mind reading.”  If such techniques 
become successful, they will not enable us to “see” experiences in any literal 
sense,58 but they will enable us to make better inferences about experiences 
than we could without them.  I briefly discuss two of these efforts here. 
1. Diagnosing Disorders of Consciousness 
In 2006, researchers used fMRI to help assess the mental activity of a 
woman believed to be in a persistent vegetative state.59  When the woman was 
scanned and asked to imagine engaging in certain actions like playing tennis or 
navigating rooms in her house, her brain activity looked remarkably similar to 
the activity in healthy control subjects who imagined engaging in the same 
activities.60  One researcher declared that the study provides “knock-down, 
drag-out” evidence of the patient’s conscious experiences.61 
Even though the study was not specifically designed to assess subjective 
experience, it still provides some evidence of the subject’s experiential life.  
For example, we now have some reason (though certainly not conclusive 
reason) to believe that the woman has had the experience of hearing the voice 
 
 58 Cf. Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, 2010 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1211, 1225–45 (criticizing legal scholars who blur conceptual differences between mind and 
brain). 
 59 Adrian M. Owen et al., Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State, 313 SCIENCE 1402, 1402 (2006). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Benedict Carey, Mental Activity Seen in a Brain Gravely Injured, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2006, at A1 
(quoting Nicholas Schiff, a neuroscientist at Weill Cornell Medical College) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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of the researchers and has had the experience of imagining herself engaging in 
activities like playing tennis and walking around her home. 
More recently, very similar techniques were used to communicate with a 
man who, for five years, was believed to be in a vegetative state.62  The man 
was instructed to think about, for example, playing tennis to give a “yes” 
response and navigating his home to give a “no” response.63  Using this 
technique, the patient correctly answered simple questions like: “Do you have 
any brothers?”64  The research shows that our ability to identify people’s 
mental states, including their experiences, is improving dramatically.  We can 
certainly expect that, in the experiential future, imaging techniques will 
provide increasingly helpful information about the experiences of people who 
are unable to communicate.  Indeed, we might be able to use this very 
technique to ask minimally conscious patients whether they are in pain.65 
2. Lie Detection 
Researchers are also working to develop mind reading technologies of 
more general application, including technologies that detect deception.  One 
older and not very successful method of detecting deception relies on the 
polygraph.  Polygraphs measure a subject’s pulse, blood pressure, respiration, 
and skin conductance while the subject is being questioned.66  Some think that 
these physiological responses reflect a subject’s level of stress and anxiety 
during questioning and that these experiential indicators provide evidence of 
whether or not the subject is lying.67  Interestingly, polygraphs measure 
 
 62 See Martin M. Monti et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of Consciousness, 362 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 579, 580–81 (2010); Benedict Carey, Trace of Thought Is Found in ‘Vegetative’ Patient, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at A1. 
 63 Monti et al., supra note 62, at 581. 
 64 Carey, supra note 62. 
 65 While we cannot assume that minimally conscious patients will provide veridical answers, we can 
never automatically accept anyone else’s pain reports as truthful and accurate.  We can nevertheless have good 
grounds to trust people’s answers.  If, for example, the pain description of some cognitively impaired person is 
indistinguishable from the descriptions of unimpaired people in a Turing-style test, see Graham Oppy & David 
Dowe, The Turing Test, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (May 13, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/turing-test, we will have good reason to trust the impaired person’s pain reports, at least absent good 
evidence to the contrary. 
 66 Paul Root Wolpe et al., Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie-Detection: Promises and Perils, AM. J. 
BIOETHICS, Mar.–Apr. 2005, at 39, 40. 
 67 Cf. Joseph R. Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to Be True?, 36 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 491, 491 (2008) (noting that polygraphs measure autonomic arousal). 
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indicators of subjective experience in order to make some further inference 
about a subject’s truthfulness. 
Polygraphs are generally considered unreliable at detecting deception.68  
Most courts are reluctant to admit evidence from polygraph tests,69 and the 
Supreme Court has held that rules of evidence that categorically ban admission 
of polygraph data do not violate defendants’ constitutional rights.70  
Importantly, however, polygraphs may be reasonably accurate tools to assess 
experiences like stress and anxiety.  Most criticism of polygraphs concerns the 
subsequent inference that stress and anxiety can provide evidence of deception.  
After all, even accurate assessments of stress and anxiety may be poor 
predictors of deception. 
Researchers are trying to develop more accurate methods of detecting 
deception using brain imaging.71  While many in the scientific community 
doubt that current brain-based methods of lie detection are sufficiently accurate 
and reliable to use in forensic contexts, that has stopped neither companies 
from marketing fMRI lie detection services to the public,72 nor litigants from 
trying to introduce such evidence in court.73 
Even if current lie detection technology is too inaccurate to rely on in court, 
we already have good reason to think about future uses of such technology.  
Given the substantial possibility that we will develop reasonably accurate lie 
detectors within the next thirty years, our current secretive behaviors have 
already become harder to hide.  A person in the year 2011 who visits a strip 
club, cheats on his spouse, evades taxes, or murders someone can surely be 
 
 68 Cf. id. (“Estimates of [polygraph] accuracy range from a high of 95 percent to a low of 50 percent, 
with the best estimate probably around 75 percent sensitivity and 65 percent specificity.” (footnote omitted)). 
 69 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 311 (1998) (“Most States maintain per se rules excluding 
polygraph evidence.”). 
 70 Id. at 305–07. 
 71 See, e.g., Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 430 (2008); Wolpe et al., supra note 66, 
at 39. 
 72 See, e.g., APPLIED FMRI INSTITUTE, supra note 4; Lie Detection, CEPHOS, http://www.cephoscorp. 
com/lie-detection/index.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); NO LIE MRI, http://noliemri.com (last visited Oct. 29, 
2010). 
 73 See United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 18, 33–39 (W.D. Tenn. May 31, 2010) (Pham, Mag., 
report and recommendation), available at http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbiosciences/files/2010/06/fMRI-
Report-and-Recommendation1.pdf (recommending that allegedly exculpatory fMRI lie detection evidence be 
excluded in a health care fraud case as insufficiently reliable and lacking sufficient probative value to 
outweigh its risk of prejudicial effect); Wilson v. Corestaff Servs. L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2010) (excluding fMRI lie detection evidence in an employment discrimination case principally on the ground 
that witness credibility is a jury question). 
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asked thirty years later about his thoughts and conduct throughout the course 
of his life.  The “look-back” potential of accurate lie detection reduces the 
probability that our current thoughts and behavior will remain secret in coming 
decades. 
In contrast to polygraphy, brain-based methods of lie detection do not 
necessarily rely on subjective experience as an intermediary.  Some approaches 
focus on cognitive activity that might indicate deception,74 and such cognition 
is not typically thought of as experiential.  Still, if these lie detection 
techniques prove reliable, they will surely influence our experiential future.  
Instead of using the crude techniques we have now to determine if, say, a 
plaintiff is malingering pain, we could ask the plaintiff if he is experiencing 
pain while assessing whether he is telling the truth. 
Importantly, however, even if we do develop good methods of detecting 
deception, we will still want other methods of measuring people’s experiences 
that do not rely on self-reports.75  For even when we have no reason to lie or 
exaggerate, we cannot easily convey the nature and intensity of our own 
experiences.  We may be the ultimate authorities about our own experiences, 
but we can still benefit from technologies that convey the nature of our 
experiences in more objective terms. 
III.  THE EXPERIENTIAL FUTURE 
Though we should pay a great deal of attention to subjective experience, 
the law often ignores the experiences of litigants, claimants, prison inmates, 
and crime victims.  In the experiential present, we can blame these failings on 
the costs and other difficulties of measurement.  In the future, however, such 
measurements will become cheaper and easier.  In this Part, I survey just a few 
of the ways in which subjective experience is important to the law and argue 
that as measurements of experience become more reliable and cost-effective, 
the law should do more to take them into account. 
 
 74 Simpson, supra note 67, at 493–94 (noting the hypothesis that additional brain activity in deception 
conditions may reflect the increased cognitive load required to withhold truthful information); cf. Daniel D. 
Langleben, Detection of Deception with fMRI: Are We There Yet?, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 1, 
4 (2008) (“[T]he model postulating that suppression of the prepotent truth is the only basic mechanism of 
[lying], needs to be revised.”). 
 75 Moreover, there are arguably criminal contexts in which the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination would permit us to measure a defendant’s experiences but not to query his experiences using lie 
detection techniques. 
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A. Tort Contexts 
In Part I, I argued that experiences are so fundamentally important to our 
lives that they have to count among the things in the world that have value or 
disvalue.  So, theories of tort law, for example, must count bad experiences 
among the various harms and costs we inflict on each other.  Precisely how tort 
law should consider subjective experience, however, depends on the details of 
one’s preferred theory of torts. 
Some scholars justify tort law as a form of corrective justice.  When a 
tortfeasor wrongfully injures his victim, he must compensate the victim for the 
past injustice.76  Among the injuries that require compensation, we must count 
various forms of pain and suffering because such experiences are highly 
disvalued.  So those who defend a corrective justice account of tort law must 
measure the pain and suffering of victims in order to ensure that they are justly 
compensated for their injuries.77 
Other scholars provide an economic analysis of tort law.78  They believe 
tort law should encourage socially beneficial behavior by forcing people to 
internalize the risks of harm they create.  Since pain and suffering represent 
kinds of harm, we can use tort law to prohibit behaviors that cause excessive 
risk of pain and suffering.79  Tort law does this by forcing those who create 
excessive risks of pain and suffering to pay compensation for those harms if 
they subsequently arise.  Thus, those who defend an economic analysis of tort 
law must take account of experiential harm to give people incentives to only 
 
 76 Cf. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 329 (1992) (“Corrective justice imposes a duty to repair 
wrongful losses on those agents responsible for them.”). 
 77 There is much disagreement about whether we should only be held responsible for harms to the extent 
we culpably cause them or whether we should be responsible for harms we cause more generally, even when 
harms are aggravated by factors beyond our control.  See MORAL LUCK (Daniel Statman ed., 1993).  If we only 
care about a tortfeasor’s antecedent beliefs (or lack thereof) about the harms he risks causing, then the actual 
experiential harms he causes will be less important.  Still, these actual harms will often provide the best 
evidence of the magnitude of harm that the tortfeasor knowingly risked causing. 
 78 The intellectual heritage of economic analyses of law can be traced back to classical utilitarianism.  
According to Richard Posner, “Modern economics has given up on trying to measure utility, because such 
measurement requires information about people’s preferences and emotions that seems unobtainable.”  
RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 96 (2001).  I claim, of course, that utility will become at 
least somewhat easier to assess in the experiential future. 
 79 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 186–87 
(1987) (“By awarding damages for ‘pain and suffering’ . . . tort judges and jurors implicitly recognize . . . that 
pain and the kind of suffering that ensues when one loses an arm or a leg, is blinded, or suffers some other 
grievous and permanent (or long-lasting) injury inflict real even though nonpecuniary cost.”) 
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risk causing such harm when doing so is expected to create greater offsetting 
benefits. 
Since no one can perfectly predict the future, those seeking optimal 
deterrence could argue that we should focus not on actual experiential harms 
but on those that should have been expected.  For example, suppose a surgeon 
can perform many more operations if he is willing to increase his rate of error.  
To decide how quickly to work, we want his decision to reflect the expected 
societal benefits of performing quick operations relative to their expected 
societal costs.  Such determinations are made not by assessing the experiences 
of individual litigants, but by aggregating data about the bad experiences of 
others who are pertinently like a particular patient.  Nevertheless, even in those 
cases where we care about expected bad experiences, our best evidence of what 
a tortfeasor should have expected will often depend on what his victim actually 
experiences.  So a court that seeks optimal deterrence, rather than corrective 
justice, might still assess the propriety of a surgeon’s decision, in part, by 
considering actual harmful consequences to particular victims. 
Many who defend an economic analysis of tort law believe that, in addition 
to deterrence, tort law can also help efficiently allocate losses.  For example, 
suppose there is an extremely small risk that some widget will injure 
consumers.  We use tort law to force the manufacturer to bear the risk of harm 
from the widget because the manufacturer can more efficiently spread the cost 
of product-related injuries.  Typically, the price of the widget will implicitly 
reflect a small premium that every customer pays in order to, in effect, buy 
insurance against the widget’s dangerous malfunction.80 
While economic analysts of tort law widely agree that tortfeasors should 
internalize pain-and-suffering costs in order to promote optimal deterrence,81 
there is much disagreement about whether we should permit pain-and-suffering 
damages at all when considering tort law’s insurance function.  A number of 
scholars have argued that rational consumers generally do not seek insurance 
 
 80 See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 
353, 362 (1988). 
 81 See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1553 
(1987) (“To obtain optimal incentives for injury prevention, a party that has violated a legal standard must pay 
full losses to the victim, including both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses.”); Robert Cooter, Towards a 
Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383, 396 (1989) (“[A]n efficient tort system creates 
incentives for people not to impose pain and suffering upon others.”). 
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for pain and suffering.82  For example, while many people buy insurance to 
help cover the costs of medical treatment, they don’t buy insurance against the 
pain and suffering frequently associated with illness.83  Similarly, though 
parents no doubt suffer terribly upon the death of a child, they generally do not 
purchase insurance on the lives of their children.84 
Other economic analysts have argued that we should compensate pain and 
suffering to further tort law’s insurance function.85  There is evidence that 
people do, in fact, insure against risks of pain and suffering and that the 
absence of formal policy coverage for pain and suffering may be due to market 
impediments.86  Indeed, in two surveys of consumer preferences about the 
harms caused by dangerous products, the vast majority of subjects expressed 
demand for pain-and-suffering insurance and had the same or similar demand 
for pain-and-suffering coverage as they did for monetary insurance.87 
But even if consumers would not insure against risks of pain and suffering, 
they are certainly not indifferent to such experiences.  Just as people who 
refrain from buying life insurance still value their lives, people who refrain 
from buying insurance against pain and suffering still value the absence of 
those experiences; there is simply insufficient demand to support a market for 
pain and suffering insurance.  If the price of insuring against pain and suffering 
through the tort system is too high, then we ought not use tort law to insure 
against pain and suffering.  The deterrence and corrective justice rationales for 
providing pain-and-suffering damages, however, would remain. 
 
 82 See, e.g., Priest, supra note 81, at 1546–47, 1553; Cooter, supra note 81, at 392 (“[A] rational person 
would insure only against that pain and suffering that curtailed earnings.”). 
 83 See Priest, supra note 81, at 1547 (“[T]here is no market for pain and suffering insurance in any 
society in the world.”). 
 84 Id. at 1546; Schwartz, supra note 80, at 365. 
 85 See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, Should Pain-and-Suffering Damages Be Abolished from Tort Law? More 
Experimental Evidence, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 941, 977 (2005) (presenting evidence “that even on pure 
insurance grounds, the preferable default rule is to provide for some pain-and-suffering damages”); Steven P. 
Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1995). 
 86 See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 76, at 421 (suggesting that first party pain-and-suffering insurance 
may not exist because insurance companies fear fraudulent claims); Jennifer H. Arlen, Reconsidering Efficient 
Tort Rules for Personal Injury: The Case of Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41, 73 n.149 
(1990) (noting that insurance companies do sell accidental death and dismemberment policies as well as 
uninsured motorist coverage, both of which provide compensation for nonpecuniary losses); Avraham, supra 
note 85, at 945–54; cf. Schwartz, supra note 80, at 365 (recognizing mixed empirical evidence that consumers 
seek to insure against pain and suffering and discussing impediments to creating such insurance). 
 87 See Avraham, supra note 85, at 962, 966–67, 975. 
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The precise ways in which we should consider subjective experience, 
including how much we must individualize our measurements, will vary 
depending on one’s preferred theory of tort law.  Whatever theory one prefers, 
however, positive law is quite clear.  Unlike many areas of the law that use 
only very rough proxies to measure experience, the tort system at least purports 
to require assessments of the pain and suffering of individual litigants.  
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, fact-finders are supposed to 
estimate fair and reasonable compensation for pain and suffering by noting 
“such factors as the intensity of the pain or humiliation, its actual or probable 
duration and the expectable consequences.”88  Tort law does not rely on a fixed 
schedule of compensation of, say, $10,000 for the pain of a broken arm or 
$20,000 for the pain of a broken leg.  Rather, despite the difficulties of 
measurement,89 as a matter of law, we are supposed to actually measure 
amounts of pain and suffering.  No matter one’s theory of tort law, the 
dominant view of tort compensation is that damages are supposed to return 
individual plaintiffs to the status quo ante, a determination that requires an 
individualized experiential assessment.90 
1. Physical Pain 
Given that at least positive law requires individualized experiential 
measurements, in the not-so-distant future, we may use some of the 
neuroimaging techniques described in Part I to help assess physical pain.  Such 
techniques might help to confirm or disconfirm claims that a person’s pain is 
entirely malingered, even if these techniques are still too inaccurate to reveal 
much more than that.  While the reliability of the technology will no doubt be 
challenged in court, it will be accepted more readily if the medical community 
uses it for other purposes, like diagnosis.  For example, doctors might seek 
more objective confirmation of a patient’s pain before prescribing narcotics for 
relief.  Such widespread use would help bring down the cost of the technology 
and likely improve its accuracy over time. 
 
 88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. b (1977). 
 89 Id. (“[I]t is impossible to require anything approximating certainty of amount even as to past harm.”). 
 90 See 1 MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 3.01 (2010) (“The general purpose of 
compensatory damages in tort actions is to give the injured party a sum of money which will restore him, as 
nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in if the wrong had not been committed; in other words, 
to make the plaintiff whole.”); see also Ellen S. Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort Compensation, 91 GEO. L.J. 659, 
660–61 (2003) (stating that “a dominant theme” among legal academics and practitioners is that tort law is 
designed to return plaintiffs to the status quo ante). 
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In the more distant future, we may be able to assess how much pain a 
person is experiencing.  That is far more difficult than assessing whether a 
patient who purports to have serious pain is entirely malingering.  If we 
examine two people with brains that are essentially identical, except that one 
brain shows more activity in regions associated with pain, we might have good 
grounds to infer that the person whose brain shows greater activity in these 
regions is also experiencing more pain than the other person.  In real life, 
however, no two people have brains that are so alike.  As we compare people 
with brains that are increasingly diverse, it becomes more difficult to make 
comparative determinations of their experiences.  Nevertheless, as our 
understanding of brain structure and function improves, we will slowly get 
better at making such comparisons.91 
a. Incorporating New Technologies into Law 
To see how new pain assessment technologies may change the law, we can 
examine the effects of related technologies in recent history.  Technologies to 
measure drunk driving may be instructive.  One way to assess people’s 
experiences is to test their levels of intoxication.  If a person scores very high 
on a blood alcohol test, he is probably experiencing symptoms like dizziness, 
nausea, or lethargy.  Generally speaking, we don’t use blood alcohol tests in 
order to assess experiences.  Rather, we use them to measure cognitive 
impairments that happen to correlate with intoxication-related experiences.  
Presumably, we don’t care if you are dizzy, nauseous, or lethargic while 
driving, so long as these experiences do not create a danger.92 
Even though we do not use intoxication tests to assess subjective 
experience, such tests nevertheless offer important lessons about the ways that 
more quantifiable measuring tools may affect our experiential future.93  Early 
drunk driving statutes set the prohibited level of intoxication using vague legal 
standards, making it a crime for a person to drive “under the influence of 
 
 91 Indeed, we make such comparisons all the time.  Consider some experience from the recent past that 
caused you physical pain.  Suppose you were faced with the prospect of having the experience again.  All else 
being equal, you would likely infer that you would experience pain similar to the pain you felt the last time.  
You would make such an inference despite the fact that your brain has changed, at least subtly, since you last 
had the painful experience. 
 92 Even so, the subjective experience of intoxication may still be relevant to drunk driving penalties.  
Drivers who experience symptoms of intoxication may be more on notice of their cognitive impairments and 
hence more deserving of punishment than intoxicated drivers who have no unusual bodily sensations to warn 
them of their impaired condition. 
 93 This discussion benefited substantially from conversations with Jennifer Mnookin. 
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intoxicants to such an extent that his ability to drive with safety to himself and 
others [was] thereby materially impaired.”94  In the early days of automobiles, 
police officers had to rely on hard-to-quantify methods of assessing a driver’s 
intoxication: the officer would smell the driver’s breath and observe his 
behavior.  In time, police, courts, and legislatures started relying on blood tests 
and breath tests to assess impairment.  Legislatures embraced these new 
technologies by modifying drunk driving statutes that had relied solely on 
vague standards of intoxication to also include a much more clearly defined 
rule.  It became illegal to drive with a blood alcohol content above the statutory 
level.95 
Thus, the history of drunk driving law may foreshadow an experiential 
future where the law changes to accommodate new technology.  When we 
shifted from relying on primitive techniques to assess impairment, like 
smelling alcohol on a driver’s breath, the law adapted accordingly.  Instead of 
defining prohibited conduct with only a vague, hard-to-measure legal standard, 
the law began to prohibit conduct defined explicitly in terms of the newer, 
more easily quantifiable technology.96  If this lesson applies to new techniques 
to measure pain and other experiences, these techniques may spark changes in 
the law to take advantage of the more precise information they make available. 
In a world with more precise units of pain, for example, the role of juries 
might change.  Rather than have juries assess damage awards for pain as they 
do now—by estimating reasonable compensation—we might develop some set 
of policies to convert amounts of pain that are caused negligently or 
intentionally into amounts of compensation.  Jurors will still have plenty of 
work to do, but once they find that a tort has occurred and caused a certain 
level of pain, we may have more uniform methods of calculating an 
 
 94 Owens v. Commonwealth, 136 S.E. 765, 766–67 (Va. 1927); see also Commonwealth v. Lyseth, 146 
N.E. 18, 18 (Mass. 1925) (making it a crime merely to drive “under the influence of intoxicating liquor”). 
 95 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (“Whoever . . . operates a motor 
vehicle with a percentage, by weight, of alcohol in their blood of eight one-hundredths or greater . . . shall be 
punished . . . .”). 
 96 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391(a) (2007) (“A person shall not drive or be in actual physical 
control of any moving vehicle while . . . [t]he person’s alcohol concentration is 0.08 grams or more . . . .”).  Of 
course, breath tests do not perfectly measure impairment.  Not everyone who drives with a particular blood 
alcohol level is impaired to the same degree.  Current breath tests may well be replaced by some better 
technology in the future. 
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appropriate level of pain compensation that depends quite directly on the 
technology we use to measure pain.97 
b. Novel Legal Questions About Pain Compensation 
If we could better measure pain, we might seek standardized units in which 
to describe it.98  This is no easy task, as pain has a variety of sensory 
components (for example, duration, texture, and intensity) and a variety of 
associated emotions.99  Since we are currently unable to disentangle these 
aspects of pain, we presumably lump them all together and let jurors do their 
best to assign a total dollar value.  If we were better able to measure pain, 
however, we might seek alternative methods of pricing pain or pain 
components. 
We might even seek to disentangle the amount of pain a person feels from 
his ability to tolerate it.  Perhaps we will someday distinguish between a 
person who is feeling a lot of pain but is good at tolerating it from another 
person who is, in some sense, feeling the same amount of pain but tolerating it 
poorly.  If we could make such a distinction (and I make no claim that we can 
or should), the law would have to determine precisely what sorts of 
experiences should be compensated and whether pain tolerance is relevant.  
Currently, however, we are so dependent on rough proxies for pain that the law 
does not address these more fine-grained questions about how various aspects 
of pain contribute to the total compensation litigants should receive. 
The burgeoning literature on hedonic psychology points to other features of 
pain we might need to address in the experiential future.  Hedonic 
psychologists study how we can increase happiness and reduce pain and 
 
 97 There are two important caveats here.  First, litigants may have constitutional rights to jury trials that 
are potentially implicated by more uniform methods of calculating damages.  Second, uniform methods of 
converting amounts of pain to dollars risk ignoring another important aspect of subjective experience.  
Namely, plaintiffs vary in the relative value they assign to dollars.  Corrective justice involves both injury and 
compensation.  If we seek to provide accurate compensation, we must consider the subjective value of both 
injury and award.  Cf. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Identifying Intense Preferences, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1391, 
1394 (2009) (arguing that entitlement allocations, to be fair or efficient, must take account of the relative 
intensity of preferences for the entitlements). 
 98 Law student Evan Fisher, commenting on an earlier draft of this Article, suggested that I call these 
units of pain “Kolbers.”  According to Fisher, “Many professors of law knowingly or unknowingly make their 
names synonymous with anguish, but few have such a legitimate opportunity.”  E-mail from T. Evan Fisher to 
author (Sept. 20, 2010, 12:11 CET) (on file with author). 
 99 Kolber, Pain Detection, supra note 1, at 436–37. 
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suffering.100  They have found, for example, that our evaluations of a painful 
episode depend especially on the peak intensity of pain during the episode and 
the amount of pain felt at the end of the episode.  So, patients will remember a 
colonoscopy as being less painful if the colonoscopy lasts longer than usual, 
provided that the pain at the end of the procedure is comparatively lower.101  
Patients will even be more likely to return for follow-up colonoscopies in 
future years when the longer procedure is used.102 
Based on this evidence, we might think that public health advocates should 
encourage doctors to use the longer procedure.  But notice that the longer 
procedure actually causes more pain in total.  So the public policy 
recommendation forces us to decide whose pain counts: Is it the pain of the 
person undergoing the procedure?  Or, is it the remembered pain of the person 
who, years later, decides whether to schedule a follow-up colonoscopy?103 
In the experiential future, this broad public policy question may be raised 
as to individual litigants.  A defendant who negligently exposed his former 
employee to carcinogenic substances may be liable to pay for the pain and 
suffering associated with future colonoscopies.  Do we consider the total 
amount of pain experienced during the procedure, or do we focus on the 
amount of pain the plaintiff-employee will remember afterwards?  A precise, 
detailed calculation of his damages requires us to address the difficult value 
questions raised by work in hedonic psychology.104  In our primitive 
experiential present, however, our estimates of pain and suffering are so rough 
that these more detailed issues are usually ignored. 
c. Measuring Baselines 
Whenever we assess the magnitude of an injury, we must consider not only 
a person’s condition at some post-injury endpoint—for example, pain at the 
doctor’s office or when in court—but must also examine his baseline 
 
 100 See, e.g., Eich et al., supra note 33, at 160; Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic 
Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 760 (2007). 
 101 Donald A. Redelmeier et al., Memories of Colonoscopy: A Randomized Trial, 104 PAIN 187, 189–93 
(2003). 
 102 Id. 
 103 See Peter H. Huang, Should Law & Policy Favor Our Experiencing or Remembering Selves? Insights 
from Happiness Studies & Neuroscience (Sept. 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 104 See Mark Kelman, Hedonic Psychology and the Ambiguities of “Welfare,” 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 391, 
398–411 (2005). 
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condition.105  If a plaintiff has 20 units of pain after a leg injury, his harm is 20 
units in magnitude, provided that he had no pain in his baseline condition.  But 
if the plaintiff already had 5 units of pain from a preexisting chronic condition 
and has a total of 20 units of pain after the injury, then the injury caused him 
15 units of pain, representing the amount of harm caused by the defendant’s 
negligence.106 
The fact that pain assessment requires at least two measurements makes 
such assessments especially difficult.  Even with the best possible technology 
to measure people’s experiential states after some injury, we cannot accurately 
assess the amount of harm caused by that injury unless we know the injured 
person’s baseline condition.  This measurement challenge is not 
insurmountable, however.  Presumably, we simply assume that, absent 
evidence to the contrary, injured people had normal, ordinary baseline 
conditions. 
We face the same baseline problem today.  If you injure my leg, we will 
generally assume that my leg was pain-free prior to the injury, absent evidence 
to the contrary.  Such assumptions may be less accurate for certain kinds of 
experiences, like anxiety and panic, if people vary to a greater degree in their 
baseline conditions.  Nevertheless, even if we can only improve our post-injury 
assessments and remain stuck with our poor baseline assessments, we would 
still be better off in the experiential future, since now we must engage in very 
rough estimates of both baseline and post-injury conditions.  And who knows 
what the future will bring?  Perhaps someday we will all have regular medical 
check-ups that gather data about our baseline conditions.  What our 
experiential future will be like depends largely on how far into the future we 
care to look. 
 
 105 See, e.g., 1 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 33–36, 204 (1984) (describing harm as a setback to 
interests); see also Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565 (2009) 
[hereinafter Kolber, Comparative Nature] (arguing that the severity of punishment must also be measured as a 
setback from a baseline position); id. at 1579–81 (challenging Seana Shiffrin’s noncomparative conception of 
harm). 
 106 The system of measuring pain I describe is greatly oversimplified for ease of explication.  Presumably, 
forensic measurement of the pain of an injury would look at levels of pain over periods of time, including 
expected future levels of pain.  In addition, there is an important debate about whether compensation baselines 
should be determined using a historical baseline (the plaintiff’s condition just before the injury) or a 
counterfactual baseline (the condition the plaintiff would have been in but for the defendant’s tortious 
conduct).  See JOEL FEINBERG, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, in FREEDOM AND 
FULFILLMENT 3, 7 (1992). 
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d. Administrative Compensation Schemes 
While the tort system generally purports to assess individualized levels of 
physical pain, the same is not true for worker’s compensation, disability, and 
other administrative schemes that typically do not compensate claimants for 
pain as such.107  Under many compensation schemes, pain serves merely as 
evidence of some other condition that the compensation scheme does 
remedy.108  For example, worker’s compensation schemes typically provide 
compensation for a particular injury without considering the varied amounts of 
distress the injury causes.109  These schemes often provide a certain number of 
weeks’ pay for a particular injury described at a fairly abstract, impersonal 
level.110 
Compensation schemes with schedules of payment likely save on 
transaction costs.  It is expensive to examine patients and determine their pain 
and suffering.  In the experiential future, however, pain and suffering will be 
cheaper and easier to measure.  We will then have greater reason for these 
schemes to consider subjective experience than they have now.  For example, 
if we ever develop a good system to measure pain in units, schedules of 
payments for pain could be calibrated in terms of those units. 
As noted earlier, however, there is much debate about whether people want 
to pay for pain-and-suffering insurance.111  If people really don’t want to insure 
against pain and suffering and if these compensation schemes are merely 
meant to provide insurance, such compensation schemes need not waste money 
on expensive individualized assessments of pain and suffering.  Even so, 
individualized assessments of pain and suffering would still be desirable in 
some cases as evidence of other physical injuries for which people do seek 
compensation through insurance. 
 
 107 See Ellen Smith Pryor, Compensation and the Ineradicable Problems of Pain, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
239, 257–304 (1991) (discussing the relevance of pain to Social Security and worker’s compensation 
programs).  Under the Social Security Disability Insurance program, pain can be a disabling condition.  See, 
e.g., Chambliss v. Massanari, 269 F.3d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[P]ain must be constant, unremitting, and 
wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment to be disabling.”); Smith v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 789, 793 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (stating that “pain in itself may be a disabling condition” and that, in any event, it “is a symptom of 
a medical impairment”).  
 108 See Pryor, supra note 107, at 240–41. 
 109 Id. 
 110 See, e.g., Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8107(c) (2006) (providing pricing 
schedule for federal employee compensation, including 160 weeks’ compensation for loss of an eye and 205 
weeks’ compensation for loss of a foot). 
 111 See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text. 
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e. Pain Relief and False Advertising 
While I have principally focused on how new technologies will inform pain 
assessment in individual cases, our improved understanding of pain may 
influence public sentiment about certain broader policy issues.  Consider the 
tort of false advertising for products that promote pain relief through a placebo 
effect.112  In FTC v. QT, Inc., for example, the Federal Trade Commission took 
action against the company that marketed “Q-Ray Ionized Bracelets” in a 
series of infamous television infomercials.113  The court held that QT engaged 
in false advertising by making deceptive or misleading claims that these 
“ionized” bracelets relieve pain.114 
There are abundant reasons to dislike QT’s marketing claims.  As one 
aspect of the case, however, the court found false QT’s claim that medical 
research has shown that the bracelets relieve pain.115  The court relied on 
experts who said that, in order to establish the bracelets’ ability to relieve pain, 
the bracelets had to perform better than a placebo bracelet in a blind research 
study.116  Yet, the bracelets may have relieved pain, even if they were no better 
than placebos.  And QT claimed only to reduce pain, not to reduce pain better 
than a placebo.117 
While some medications treat symptoms through pharmacological 
pathways, placebos relieve pain principally by generating the expectation that 
they relieve pain.118  Ironically, it is quite possible that the more hyperbolic 
QT’s claims were, the better the bracelets could relieve pain by reinforcing 
expectations of pain relief.  If the company did anything to relieve pain, it did 
so by using infomercials to generate expectations of relief, not by “ionization” 
or other hocus-pocus. 
 
 112 I discuss placebo effects in more detail in Adam J. Kolber, A Limited Defense of Clinical Placebo 
Deception, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 75 (2007) [hereinafter Kolber, Placebo Deception]. 
 113 448 F. Supp. 2d 908, 912, 917–18 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 114 Id. at 960–67. 
 115 Id. at 938. 
 116 Id. at 937–44.  The court also noted that when “a product’s effectiveness arises solely as a result of the 
placebo effect, a representation that the product is effective constitutes a ‘false advertisement’ even though 
some consumers may experience positive results.”  Id. at 964 (quoting FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 
1100 (9th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117 Id. at 912. 
 118 Ginger A. Hoffman et al., Pain and the Placebo: What We Have Learned, 48 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 
248, 257–58 (2005); Donald D. Price & Howard L. Fields, The Contribution of Desire and Expectation to 
Placebo Analgesia: Implications for New Research Strategies, in THE PLACEBO EFFECT: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPLORATION 117, 117 (Anne Harrington ed., 1997). 
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Though many people resist the idea that placebos generate real pain relief, 
neuroscientists have bolstered belief in the power of placebos in the face of 
recent attacks.119  They have enabled us to better understand and visualize the 
mechanisms of placebo pain relief.  For example, neuroscientists have used 
functional brain imaging to show that placebo treatments reduce activation in 
regions of the brain associated with pain, suggesting that placebo effects are 
not merely due to biases in the ways that patients report their experiences to 
investigators.120  When subjects are exposed to a painful stimulus and given a 
pharmacologically inactive cream (which they are deceptively told relieves 
pain), they show brain activity similar to that of subjects receiving 
pharmacologically active analgesics.121  While we have long known about the 
placebo effect prior to recent advances in brain imaging, the neuroscience 
research has helped make placebo effects more palpable to those who are 
skeptical of hard-to-assess claims of pain relief.  If we come to better 
appreciate the power of placebo pain relief, we may become less skeptical of 
placebo pain relief advertising claims. 
In QT, the court noted that “an advertisement will be found misleading and 
deceptive if,” among other things, it “is likely to mislead consumers acting 
reasonably under the circumstances.”122  Quite possibly, reasonable consumers 
are likely to be misled by the claim that a product is an effective pain reliever 
when it is no better than a placebo.  So I am not criticizing the court’s 
interpretation of the law.  There may also be good policy reasons to prohibit 
companies from marketing products that perform no better than placebos, 
particularly if the marketing conveys the impression that a product works 
better than a placebo. 
 
 119 See Asbjørn Hróbjartsson & Peter C. Gøtzsche, Is the Placebo Powerless? An Analysis of Clinical 
Trials Comparing Placebo with No Treatment, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1594, 1595–99 (2001) (“We found little 
evidence in general that placebos had powerful clinical effects.”); see also Gunver S. Kienle & Helmut Kiene, 
The Powerful Placebo Effect: Fact or Fiction?, 50 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1311, 1316 (1997) (“[W]e have 
not found any reliable demonstration of the existence of placebo effects.”). 
 120 Wager et al., supra note 38, at 1162; see also Fabrizio Benedetti et al., Conscious Expectation and 
Unconscious Conditioning in Analgesic, Motor, and Hormonal Placebo/Nocebo Responses, 23 J. 
NEUROSCIENCE 4315, 4315 (2003); Predrag Petrovic et al., Placebo and Opioid Analgesia—Imaging a Shared 
Neuronal Network, 295 SCIENCE 1737, 1737 (2002); Tor D. Wager, The Neural Bases of Placebo Effects in 
Anticipation and Pain, 3 SEMINARS PAIN MED. 22, 29 (2005). 
 121 Wager et al., supra note 38, at 1162–63. 
 122 QT, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 957 (citing FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994), and 
Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
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My point is simply that, even if QT’s claims were misleading and entitled 
plaintiffs to relief, QT’s claims were probably not, strictly speaking, false.123  
As recent neuroscience research confirms, placebos can relieve pain.  A 
company that markets a placebo by advertising its ability to relieve pain is not 
making a false claim, assuming that the particular placebo has the advertised 
effect relative to using no treatment at all.  Our better understanding of the 
subjective experience of pain relief reminds us that, even if good policy 
reasons dictate caution when exploiting placebo effects, courts should 
recognize that placebo relief is genuine relief.124 
2. Emotional Distress 
For a long time, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers have 
provided expert testimony about litigants’ emotional distress, including their 
 
 123 In fact, there had been a double-blind, placebo-controlled study of the bracelets conducted by 
researchers at the Mayo Clinic.  Robert L. Bratton et al., Effect of “Ionized” Wrist Bracelets on 
Musculoskeletal Pain: A Randomized, Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Trial, 77 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1164 
(2002).  You may be surprised to learn that the researchers found “significant improvement in pain scores” in 
those who wore Q-Ray bracelets.  Id. at 1164, 1166.  You probably will not be surprised to learn that they also 
found significant improvement in pain scores in the group that wore ordinary bracelets that were not “ionized.”  
Id. at 1164.  As we would expect, the pain relief from the ionized bracelets and the ordinary bracelets was 
about the same.  Id. 
Still, the advertising for Q-Ray bracelets focused on the claim that the bracelets relieve pain, and there 
is good reason to believe that they did just that, at least for many purchasers.  See id.  The matter is not entirely 
clear, however, because the Mayo Clinic did not even test the right group to establish whether the bracelets 
relieve pain.  Id. at 1167–68.  To make that comparison, the team should have tested a group of subjects that 
wore Q-Ray bracelets against a group that wore no bracelets at all.  See id. at 1167.  Then we could see 
whether the bracelets relieved pain through a placebo effect or whether subjects just got better over time. 
 124 In 2006, the American Medical Association (AMA), the country’s largest and most established 
professional body of doctors, banned doctors from using placebos deceptively, see COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & 
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CEJA REPORT 2-I-06, PLACEBO USE IN CLINICAL PRACTICE (2006).  The 
AMA banned placebo deception even though doctors administer placebos, in one form or another, quite 
frequently.  Rachel Sherman & John Hickner, Academic Physicians Use Placebos in Clinical Practice and 
Believe in the Mind–Body Connection, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 7, 7 (2008); Jon C. Tilburt et al., 
Prescribing “Placebo Treatments”: Results of National Survey of US Internists and Rheumatologists, 337 
BRIT. MED. J. 1097, 1098–99 (2008). 
By categorically banning deceptive use of placebos, it is now deemed unethical for a doctor to 
recommend a QT bracelet or other placebo intervention to a patient, without disclosing—and thereby 
eviscerating or at least weakening—the placebo nature of the product.  The ban forces us to weigh interests in 
autonomy and doctor–patient trust against the beneficial pain-relieving effects of placebos.  See Kolber, 
Placebo Deception, supra note 112, at 114–16, 125–27.  Yet, we cannot balance such interests appropriately 
unless we have good measures of placebo pain relief under a variety of conditions—something we can hope 
for in our experiential future.  While there may be good policy reasons for the court’s decision in QT and for 
the AMA’s prohibition, we should be wary that the prohibition subtly reflects perceptions that placebo relief is 
somehow inferior to other forms of pain relief.  For an in-depth discussion of why we ought not categorically 
prohibit use of placebo deception, see id. at 114–27. 
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experiences of panic, depression, and anxiety.  One way these experts make 
assessments of subjective experience is by obtaining litigants’ self-reports.  But 
in forensic contexts, litigants have incentives to lie, and we are disinclined to 
trust their claims.  While mental health professionals have some methods of 
detecting malingering,125 in the experiential future, they will have far better 
methods of diagnosing psychiatric symptoms and estimating their severity, 
even when subjects have incentives to lie. 
a. Damages for “Suffering” 
To be sure, we are just beginning to develop new technologies to assess 
emotional distress and related phenomena.126  Researchers are working hard to 
identify brain structures or patterns of brain activity associated with particular 
emotions and psychiatric disorders.127  Studies looking at brain structure have 
found that depression and chronic stress are associated with smaller 
hippocampi128 and that currently depressed subjects have higher amygdala 
volumes than healthy subjects.129  Those with post-traumatic stress disorder, 
social anxiety disorder, and specific phobias show hyperactivity in the 
 
 125 See generally Michael Sharpe, Distinguishing Malingering from Psychiatric Disorders, in 
MALINGERING AND ILLNESS DECEPTION 156 (Peter W. Halligan et al. eds., 2003) (describing methods of 
detecting feigned psychiatric disorders). 
 126 Not all advances in our ability to assess the experiences of others will come from neuroscientists.  We 
know, for example, that people with naturally red hair are more likely to be anxious about visiting the dentist.  
Catherine J. Binkley et al., Genetic Variations Associated with Red Hair Color and Fear of Dental Pain, 
Anxiety Regarding Dental Care and Avoidance of Dental Care, 140 J. AM. DENTAL ASS’N 896, 897 (2009).  A 
high percentage of people with naturally red hair (almost all, in one study) have a gene variant that makes 
them less responsive to the local anesthetics used by dentists.  Id. at 897, 900.  Since redheads have been 
undermedicated on previous occasions, they are correspondingly more anxious about visits to the dentist.  Id. 
at 904.  The finding led a group of researchers to recommend to dentists that they be especially sensitive to the 
management of dental pain and anxiety in those with red hair.  Id. 
 127 See, e.g., Lisa Feldman Barrett et al., The Experience of Emotion, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 373 (2007); 
Ethan Kross et al., Coping with Emotions Past: The Neural Bases of Regulating Affect Associated with 
Negative Autobiographical Memories, 65 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 361 (2009); Tor D. Wager et al., 
Prefrontal-Subcortical Pathways Mediating Successful Emotion Regulation, 59 NEURON 1037 (2008); Jamil 
Zaki et al., Different Circuits for Different Pain: Patterns of Functional Connectivity Reveal Distinct Networks 
for Processing Pain in Self and Others, 2 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 276 (2007). 
 128 See Sonia J. Lupien et al., Stress Hormones and Human Memory Function Across the Lifespan, 30 
PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 225, 238 (2005) (“[C]hronic exposure to elevated levels of [hormones 
released when a person experiences stress] is related to both memory impairments and a smaller volume of the 
hippocampus.”); Yvette I. Sheline et al., Depression Duration but Not Age Predicts Hippocampal Volume Loss 
in Medically Healthy Women with Recurrent Major Depression, 19 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5034, 5039 (1999) 
(reporting “smaller hippocampal volumes in subjects with a history of depression”). 
 129 Philip van Eijndhoven et al., Amygdala Volume Marks the Acute State in the Early Course of 
Depression, 65 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 812, 815–16 (2009). 
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amygdala and insula under functional brain imaging.130  Those with phobias 
have atypical brain metabolism and patterns of electrical activity,131 and those 
with unipolar depression show different brain activity than those with bipolar 
depression.132  Many similar studies that investigate the biology of human 
experience have been undertaken or are underway.133 
When plaintiffs suffer as part of some broader tortious injury, they are 
frequently entitled to recover damages for their emotional distress.  So 
technologies that confirm or disconfirm emotional distress or indicate 
something about the intensity of a person’s distress will have important 
applications in the tort context, just like technologies that reveal physical pain. 
Emotional harm can also constitute the core of a tortious injury.  Under 
some circumstances, plaintiffs can sue for intentional or negligent inflictions of 
emotional distress.  But though tort law generally seeks to compensate people 
for their physical and emotional pain, a number of doctrines limit stand-alone 
claims of emotional distress.  New technologies should eventually spark 
revisions to ease these limitations.134  The next two sections explain why legal 
doctrine should change as our measurements of emotional distress improve. 
 
 130 Amit Etkin & Tor D. Wager, Functional Neuroimaging of Anxiety: A Meta-Analysis of Emotional 
Processing in PTSD, Social Anxiety Disorder, and Specific Phobia, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1476, 1482, 1485 
(2007). 
 131 Richard J. Davidson et al., While a Phobic Waits: Regional Brain Electrical and Autonomic Activity in 
Social Phobics During Anticipation of Public Speaking, 47 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 85, 85 (2000) (“[Social 
p]hobics showed a marked increase in right-sided activation in the anterior temporal and lateral prefrontal 
scalp regions.”). 
 132 See Janis Kelly, ICBD 2009: fMRI Differentiates Bipolar from Major Depression, MEDSCAPE (July 1, 
2009), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/705207. 
 133 See, e.g., Carmen Andreescu et al., fMRI Activation in Late-Life Anxious Depression: A Potential 
Biomarker, 24 INT’L J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 820 (2009) (examining event-related fMRI data to identify the 
neuroanatomical substrate of late-life anxious depression); Mary L. Phillips & Eduard Vieta, Identifying 
Functional Neuroimaging Biomarkers of Bipolar Disorder: Toward DSM-V, 33 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 893 
(2007) (discussing the search for neuroimaging evidence to distinguish unipolar and bipolar depression); 
Heather L. Urry et al., Making a Life Worth Living: Neural Correlates of Well-Being, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 367, 
368–69 (2004) (describing electroencephalographic correlates of self-reported well-being and positive affect); 
Thomas Frank, Anxiety-Detecting Machines Could Spot Terrorists, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2008, at 2A 
(describing the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to develop a machine that uses “sharp swings in 
body temperature, pulse and breathing [to] signal the kind of anxiety exuded by a would-be terrorist or 
criminal”). 
 134 See Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience, Emotional Harm, and Emotional Distress Tort Claims, AM. J. 
BIOETHICS, Sept. 2007, at 65, 66; Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends and 
Directions for Future Scholarship, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Sept. 2007, at 44, 45–46; A.M. Viens, The Use of 
Functional Neuroimaging Technology in the Assessment of Loss and Damages in Tort Law, AM. J. BIOETHICS, 
Sept. 2007, at 63, 65. 
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b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress limits recovery to 
those cases where “extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly 
causes severe emotional distress.”135  The bar to recovery is high.  As a 
comment to the Restatement (Second) of Torts notes: “Liability has been found 
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in 
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”136 
There are two principal reasons for limiting recovery for intentional 
inflictions of distress to only the most egregious violations.  First, the conduct 
must be “extreme and outrageous” and cause “severe” distress because not all 
intentional inflictions of distress should generate tort liability.137  Making 
someone the butt of a mild joke may intentionally inflict subjective distress, 
but the distress may not be severe enough to warrant state intrusion into our 
daily lives.  In such cases, we limit the scope of the tort, not because we cannot 
measure subjective distress, but rather because we can measure it well enough 
to decide that the conduct at issue is too minor to warrant state intervention. 
The second principal reason for limiting the scope of the tort, however, is 
related to measurement difficulties.  Courts raise barriers to recovery for 
intentional infliction of distress partly out of fear of bogus claims.  An early 
case to grant recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress, for 
example, warned about “trumped-up claims” that rely only on “subjective 
symptoms”: 
On the whole we see no good reason why a wrongful invasion of 
a legal right, causing an injury to the body or mind which reputable 
physicians recognize and can trace with reasonable certainty to the 
act as its true cause, should not give rise to a right of action against 
the wrongdoer, although there was no visible hurt at the time of the 
act complained of.  Of course, there is always a possibility of 
trumped-up claims if there may be a recovery when no evidence of 
 
 135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); see also John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: 
Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 798–806 (2007) (describing the elements of an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim). 
 136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). 
 137 See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 
1033, 1035 (1936) (“Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident 
to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law 
could ever be.”). 
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bodily injury can be discovered immediately.  However, the matter is 
in the control of the trial courts, and verdicts for plaintiffs for any 
substantial amounts, when based chiefly on proof of subjective 
symptoms, will not usually be allowed to stand.138 
While courts are clearly concerned about bogus claims in intentional infliction 
of distress cases, those fears should be reduced as we get better at identifying 
and assessing genuine cases of emotional distress.  As claims of emotional 
distress become harder to fake or exaggerate, courts have less reason to 
demand the more readily observable proxies for distress that they frequently 
require today. 
c. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Evidentiary barriers to recovery are even clearer in cases of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.  As Betsy Grey has argued, such barriers may 
be particularly apt to fall in the face of better technology.139  Courts have only 
recently permitted recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, as 
they feared, among other things, that recognizing the action would lead to 
frivolous or fraudulent lawsuits.140  Indeed, according to the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, one can only recover damages for the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress when the distress is accompanied by some more concrete 
physical manifestation of harm,141 like nausea, vomiting, or, in some 
jurisdictions, nightmares.142 
 
 138 Johnson v. Sampson, 208 N.W. 814, 816 (Minn. 1926); see also Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 613, 
617 (Md. 1977) (recognizing increasing acceptance of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress but 
finding evidence of plaintiff’s distress “vague and weak at best”). 
 139 Grey, supra note 134. 
 140 See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 545 (1994) (“Because the etiology of emotional 
disturbance is usually not as readily apparent as that of a broken bone following an automobile accident, courts 
have been concerned . . . that recognition of a cause of action for [emotional] injury when not related to any 
physical trauma may inundate judicial resources with a flood of relatively trivial claims, many of which may 
be imagined or falsified . . . .” (first and second alterations in original) (quoting Maloney v. Conroy, 545 A.2d 
1059, 1061 (Conn. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 360–61 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (noting that courts limit 
recovery for emotional distress in part because of “the danger that claims of mental harm will be falsified or 
imagined”); Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 36 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 808 (2004) (noting that the difficulty of proving mental injuries makes courts wary of false 
claims). 
 141 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 313(1), 436A (1965); Kircher, supra note 135, at 809. 
 142 Grey, supra note 134. 
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As with intentional inflictions of distress, we limit recovery for negligent 
inflictions for multiple reasons.  We require physical manifestations of 
emotional harm, in part, to limit recovery to the most egregious instances of 
negligent conduct.  The coercive machinery of the state should only be used to 
prohibit especially negligent inflictions of distress.  The presence of a physical 
manifestation of distress, however, can serve only as a rough proxy for the 
severity of the distress.  A person contemplating suicide may have no physical 
manifestation of his distress, even if his distress is far more severe than the 
distress of someone else who happens to have modest physical manifestations.  
In the experiential future, we will be hard-pressed to defend physical 
manifestation requirements. 
We will also be hard-pressed to defend other limits on recovery for 
negligent infliction of distress, including requirements in some jurisdictions 
that plaintiffs suffer concurrent physical impact or be located within a zone of 
danger.143  Physical injury and zone-of-danger requirements presumably 
demonstrate that a plaintiff really did suffer from an intense emotional ordeal.  
Nevertheless, emotional suffering can be quite severe even absent physical 
injury or proximity to injury.  And some emotional suffering can be relatively 
modest, even if the suffering was generated in a zone of danger or associated 
with physical impact.  From a theoretical perspective, there are no good 
grounds for these requirements unless they are understood as inaccurate 
proxies for the measurement of the intensity of a plaintiff’s emotional distress.  
In the experiential future, such proxies should become less and less important. 
B. Punishment Contexts 
As noted, black letter tort law requires us to try to measure the experiences 
of particular people.  Though we often rely on rough proxies for these 
experiences, at least the law recognizes their importance to the assessment of 
damages.  By contrast, even though the harms of crime and punishment consist 
largely of bad experiences, our assessments of blameworthiness and 
punishment severity in criminal law are far less sensitive to subjective 
experience than are our assessments of tort damages.  Most criminal statutes 
make no explicit reference to the causation of bad experiences.  There are 
some statutes that are violated when, for example, a defendant causes 
 
 143 Kircher, supra note 135, at 810, 815–16. 
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“substantial pain,”144 but such statutes are more the exception than the rule.  
Victim impact gets some attention at sentencing, but only modest investigatory 
resources are spent quantifying victim injuries.145  Judges pay even less 
attention to the different ways in which offenders experience punishment.146  I 
will argue that, according to our prevailing justifications of punishment, we are 
usually required to take subjective experience into account when making 
determinations both of blameworthiness and of punishment severity. 
1. Blameworthiness 
There are two principal ways in which better monitoring of subjective 
experience can improve determinations of blameworthiness.  I will first discuss 
how assessments of subjective experience can provide evidence about whether 
or not a crime occurred and, hence, whether anyone is blameworthy at all.  
Then, I will discuss cases in which offenders are clearly blameworthy to some 
extent and how new technologies may tell us something about how 
blameworthy they are. 
a. Whether a Crime Occurred 
I have already noted how breath tests can help reveal whether a driver has 
committed the crime of driving under the influence.147  Pain assessment 
technologies can also help reveal whether a crime has been committed.  If 
Smith claims that Jones deliberately hit Smith’s foot with a hammer, 
neuroscience evidence that Smith is not in pain immediately after the alleged 
battery could serve as some evidence that no battery occurred.  Other 
technologies may identify much longer lasting biological markers of 
experiences, like childhood physical or sexual abuse, and could be useful not 
only in criminal contexts but also in tort and child custody cases. 
 
 144 For example, under New York law, a person commits assault in the third degree when he intentionally 
or recklessly causes “physical injury to another person,” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 2010), where 
physical injury is defined as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain,” id. § 10.00(9) (emphasis 
added). 
 145 See generally Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 229 
(2005) (describing the marginalization of victims in the criminal justice process). 
 146 Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 192–96 (2009) 
[hereinafter Kolber, Subjective Experience]. 
 147 See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
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i. Child Physical and Sexual Abuse 
Over three million possible cases of child abuse and neglect were referred 
to child protective services agencies in the United States in 2009.148  While 
some of these cases may be bogus or otherwise fail to satisfy pertinent legal 
standards, a vast number of genuine cases of abuse cannot be proven.149  In 
cases of physical abuse, diagnostic images of the brain have long been used in 
court.  For example, brain imaging is frequently used to provide evidence of 
physical trauma to the brain.150  Evidence of sexual abuse can be more difficult 
to find.  Occasionally, child sexual abuse can be diagnosed based on unusual 
physical or laboratory findings, as when the abuse leads to physical injury, 
pregnancy, or disease transmission.  But “[s]exual abuse is rarely diagnosed on 
the basis of only physical examination or laboratory findings,” because 
“[p]hysical findings are often absent.”151 
In many or most cases of childhood abuse, we can gather needed evidence 
simply by speaking to the victim.  In some cases, however, victims may be too 
young to speak, or we may prefer to spare children the obligation to relive their 
abuse.152  In other cases, when abuse is alleged to have occurred a long time 
ago, the reliability of victims’ recollections has been questioned.153  If there 
were practical methods of developing better evidence of victimization, such 
methods could be extremely useful in supporting genuine claims of abuse and 
in challenging spurious ones. 
A growing neuroscience literature suggests that childhood trauma can 
affect the development of the brain.  The effects of childhood trauma may last 
 
 148 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2009, at viii 
(2009), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm09/cm09.pdf; see also Mark S. Lipian et al., 
Assessing the Verity of Children’s Allegations of Abuse: A Psychiatric Overview, 27 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 
249, 250–51 (2004). 
 149 See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 148, at viii. 
 150 See, e.g., Chapa v. United States, No. 8:04CV376, 2006 WL 1794763, at *1, *9 (D. Neb. June 26, 
2006); Middleton v. State, 980 So. 2d 351, 355–59 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); In re Pers. Restraint of Brooks, No. 
33020-2-II, 2007 WL 1129655, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2007); see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, 
Diagnostic Imaging of Child Abuse, 105 PEDIATRICS 1345, 1346–47 (2000). 
 151 Nancy Kellogg & Comm. on Child Abuse & Neglect, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, The Evaluation of 
Sexual Abuse in Children, 116 PEDIATRICS 506, 509 (2005); see also Joyce A. Adams, The Role of the Medical 
Evaluation in Suspected Child Sexual Abuse, in TRUE AND FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 231, 
232–33 (Tara Ney ed., 1995). 
 152 Some jurisdictions are especially friendly to hearsay evidence that spares children the obligation to 
testify in court about their abuse.  See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(vi) (McKinney 2010). 
 153 See, e.g., ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY 3–7 
(1994). 
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into adulthood, even when the childhood trauma left no easily observed 
physical injuries.  According to neuroscientist Debra Niehoff: 
Over the last three decades, both animal studies and clinical research 
on human abuse victims have demonstrated that the nervous system 
is highly sensitive to stress and trauma during the first years of life, 
and that abuse need not involve an actual physical injury to do lasting 
damage to the developing brain.  Furthermore, trauma-induced 
aberrations in neural structure and function are essentially corruptions 
of fundamental neural mechanisms evolved to prepare the individual 
for survival in dangerous or capricious environments, and they are 
not erased by maturation. . . .  Bones mend and bruises fade, but the 
harm done to the brain by the experience of violence leaves enduring 
scars that, while invisible to the casual observer, have long-lasting 
implications for the health, well-being, and social functioning of the 
abuse victim.154 
In one recent study, researchers found possible epigenetic markers of 
childhood abuse.155  While we inherit our genetic code from our parents, our 
genome is subject to so-called epigenetic influence from the environment that 
can affect the expression of our genetic traits.156  This particular study looked 
at gene expression of glucocorticoid receptors, proteins in cell membranes that 
enable our bodies to respond to the stress hormone glucocorticoid.157 
The researchers looked at the level of glucocorticoid receptor expression in 
brain tissue of three groups of people: (1) twelve suicide victims with a history 
of being abused in childhood, (2) twelve suicide victims without a history of 
being abused in childhood, and (3) twelve control subjects who died for other 
reasons and had no history of abuse.158  They found a statistically lower level 
of glucocorticoid receptor expression in the group of suicide victims with a 
history of abuse in childhood than they did in the other two groups.159  By 
 
 154 Debra Niehoff, Invisible Scars: The Neurobiological Consequences of Child Abuse, 56 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 849, 849–50 (2007); see also Christine Heim et al., Pituitary-Adrenal and Autonomic Responses to Stress 
in Women After Sexual and Physical Abuse in Childhood, 284 JAMA 592 (2000); M. B. Stein et al., 
Hippocampal Volume in Women Victimized by Childhood Sexual Abuse, 27 PSYCHOL. MED. 951 (1997). 
 155 Patrick O. McGowan et al., Epigenetic Regulation of the Glucocorticoid Receptor in Human Brain 
Associates with Childhood Abuse, 12 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 342 (2009). 
 156 See Fazal Khan, Preserving Human Potential as Freedom: A Framework for Regulating Epigenetic 
Harms, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 259, 266–71 (2010). 
 157 See Nick Z. Lu et al., The Pharmacology and Classification of the Nuclear Receptor Superfamily: 
Glucocorticoid, Mineralocorticoid, Progesterone, and Androgen Receptors, 58 PHARMACOLOGICAL REV. 782, 
784 (2006). 
 158 McGowan et al., supra note 155, at 343. 
 159 Id. 
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contrast, those who committed suicide but had not been abused had no 
statistically significant difference in the level of receptor expression than 
control subjects.160 
We don’t know precisely why these differences were observed, but 
whatever the underlying mechanism, the researchers identified possible 
biomarkers in the group that committed suicide and had been abused that 
varied substantially from the markers in the other groups of subjects.  If the 
markers are valid and reliable, they might someday help us determine whether 
an individual was abused as a child. 
To be sure, this study has many limitations.  First, it has a small sample 
size and has yet to be repeated by other researchers.  Second, the data reflect 
differences in groups of people and may not be sufficiently fine-grained to 
provide useful information about individuals.  Third, those who commit 
suicide are likely to have suffered more severely than the average victim, so 
results might vary in subjects who were less severely victimized.  Fourth, the 
research is unlikely to distinguish various forms of childhood adversity, so 
child physical abuse, sexual abuse, and neglect might look the same.  If a child 
witnesses an upsetting, accidental killing, his body might undergo epigenetic 
changes like those of children who have been abused.  Fifth, the underlying 
work on epigenetics is at an early stage, and many basic questions in 
epigenetics have yet to be answered.  Finally, the research examined brain 
tissue from deceased subjects, an approach that cannot safely be used on living 
people.  While researchers are searching for similar epigenetic markers of 
adversity in other tissue, like white-blood cells,161 the technique will have 
limited value so long as the only reliable markers of adversity are in brain 
tissue. 
But under the right circumstances, even epigenetic markers in brain tissue 
could prove extremely valuable.  Imagine their use in a case based on the life 
and death of pop-music legend Michael Jackson.  Jackson claimed that he was 
repeatedly subject to physical abuse from his father when he was a child.  
 
 160 Id.  When glucocorticoid receptor genes undergo a process called methylation, the expression of the 
gene is reduced.  Id.  By examining the percentage of sites that were methylated in candidate methylation sites, 
the researchers also found a greater percentage of methylation in candidate sites in those who both committed 
suicide and were abused than they found in the other groups.  Id. at 343 fig.2.a.  These methylation biomarkers 
may be even more distinctive than biomarkers that merely rely on the level of glucocorticoid receptor 
expression. 
 161 E-mail from Dr. Moshe Szyf, GSK Professor of Pharmacology and James McGill Professor, McGill 
Univ., Dep’t of Pharmacology & Therapeutics, to author (June 25, 2009, 09:52 EST) (on file with author). 
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When Jackson died, he was a single parent with three children of his own.  Had 
Jackson’s father sought custody of Jackson’s children, it might be very 
important to determine whether or not Jackson’s father really did abuse 
Jackson in childhood.  Since Jackson would have already died prior to this 
hypothetical custody battle, it would be relatively easy to examine his brain 
tissue for pertinent epigenetic markers of abuse. 
Moreover, even if these biomarkers fail to distinguish between various 
kinds of childhood adversity, they might still be helpful in court.  The presence 
of the relevant markers might provide little evidence of Jackson’s father’s 
culpability because the childhood adversity could have had many different 
causes or perpetrators.  Nevertheless, the absence of the pertinent markers, 
assuming the markers prove reliable, could be evidence of the absence of 
childhood adversity.  So this sort of evidence may be asymmetric; it may be 
more helpful to exculpate than inculpate.  Still, anything that improves the 
accuracy of child abuse cases is an important tool. 
b. How Much Blame 
So far, I have described how brain-based biological markers associated 
with past experiences could support or challenge claims that someone has 
engaged in a crime.  In other situations, we know that a person has broken a 
criminal law but dispute how much punishment he should receive.  For 
example, in the sentencing phase of death penalty cases, we allow murderers to 
introduce evidence of childhood abuse or neglect to argue that they do not 
deserve to be executed.162  The harsh circumstances of their youth purportedly 
mitigate their blameworthiness.  So long as courts permit such evidence, 
epigenetic markers of childhood adversity may bear on assessments of 
blameworthiness in death penalty cases. 
Subjective experience is much more broadly relevant to punishment 
severity when we consider victim experiences.  As a general rule, the more a 
crime victim suffers, the more the perpetrator should be punished.  The precise 
reasons will vary, however, depending on how one justifies punishment.  In the 
 
 162 See Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for the Death Penalty, 77 
N.C. L. REV. 1143, 1156 (1999) (“Evidence that the defendant was abused as a child is one of the more 
intuitively recognizable forms of mitigating evidence.  A general societal understanding exists that a person 
abused as a child will likely suffer some kind of long-term negative behavioral and perceptual effects.” 
(footnote omitted)); see also O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1299–1302 (2007) (discussing the use of brain imaging evidence in death penalty cases). 
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next two subsections, I will show why our prevailing theories of punishment, 
both retributivist and consequentialist, generally lead to the conclusion that 
those who cause more experiential harms should be punished more severely.  
These theories imply that assessments of victims’ subjective experiences are 
often quite relevant to sentencing. 
i. Retributivists 
According to most retributivists, offenders should be punished in 
proportion to their blameworthiness.163  Offenders who commit more serious 
crimes like murder or rape should be punished more severely than offenders 
who commit less serious crimes like drug possession or prostitution. 
Importantly, the seriousness of a crime will depend in important ways on 
the experiential harms it causes.  To illustrate, suppose that Harsh and Harsher 
separately decide to rob elderly men in a park.  Each has a choice between 
taking $100 from: (a) a man who will be extraordinarily upset by the robbery 
for a long time, or (b) a man who will merely be a little upset by the robbery 
for a very short time.  Assume that both robbers know the emotional responses 
of their potential victims.  Harsh chooses the victim who will recover quite 
quickly, because Harsh simply wants $100 and does not want to cause 
unnecessary suffering.  Harsher, by contrast, chooses the victim who will be 
traumatized by the robbery, either because Harsher prefers to cause his victim 
to suffer or because he doesn’t care about victim suffering, and so he is 
indifferent between the two victims. 
In this scenario, Harsher is more blameworthy than Harsh.  Surely, much of 
the harm of robbery consists of the fear and trauma that robberies cause.  
Otherwise, we would treat robbery the same way that we treat lesser forms of 
theft that do not involve confrontations.  Since Harsh seeks to cause less harm 
than does Harsher, Harsh is less blameworthy.  If one accepts the retributivist 
 
 163 According to John Rawls, retributivists hold that “[i]t is morally fitting that a person who does wrong 
should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing.  That a criminal should be punished follows from his guilt, and 
the severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of his act.”  John Rawls, Two Concepts of 
Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955); see also George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 SW. U. L. 
REV. 413, 427–28 (1981) (stating that it is a “basic principle of just punishment” that “[p]unishment must be 
proportional to wrongdoing”); Douglas N. Husak, “Already Punished Enough,” 18 PHIL. TOPICS 79, 83 (1990) 
(“A corollary of the ‘just deserts’ theory is the principle of proportionality, according to which the severity of a 
punishment should be a function of the seriousness of the offense.”).  I use the term “blameworthiness” in the 
text to generically capture notions of proportional retribution that depend on “wrongdoing,” “the seriousness of 
an offense,” and other similar phrases. 
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view that we should punish in proportion to blameworthiness, then Harsh 
should be punished less than Harsher. 
Just as tort theorists have different views about when to consider an 
action’s actual consequences as opposed to its expected consequences, so do 
retributivists.  On what I call the “only-culpability” view, an offender’s 
blameworthiness depends only on his mental state with respect to the harm that 
he causes or risks causing.164  So, an offender’s culpability depends on the 
risks of harm that he purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and (perhaps) 
negligently accepted by engaging in criminal behavior.165  In the case of Harsh 
and Harsher, Harsh knowingly caused some harm to his victim but less than 
the harm that Harsher knowingly caused.  So Harsh is less blameworthy. 
According to the only-culpability view, once we have determined the 
pertinent facts about an offender’s mental state, the amount of harm he actually 
causes is irrelevant to his blameworthiness.  On this view, we have no reason 
to differentially punish attempted crimes and completed crimes that differ only 
in terms of the amount of harm that was unforeseeably caused.  So, if an 
assassin fires a bullet intending to kill his victim and a bird happens to fly by 
and deflect the bullet, the assassin’s blameworthiness is in no way reduced 
simply because a bird intervened to reduce the harmfulness of the assassin’s 
action.  What matters is the serious risk of death the assassin intentionally 
accepted, not the chance forces that determined the outcome. 
On another view, call it the “culpability-plus-harm” view, blameworthiness 
depends both on the sort of culpability just described, as well as the amount of 
harm an offender actually causes.  Under this view, the actual results of an 
offender’s conduct appropriately affect our assessments of his 
blameworthiness, even when the results depend in large measure on chance.  
According to this view, the assassin’s blameworthiness depends quite 
importantly on whether or not the bird deflected the bullet.  If the bird does not 
deflect the bullet, the assassin deserves the very severe punishment associated 
with murder.  If the bird does deflect the bullet, the assassin deserves the more 
modest punishment associated with attempted murder.  Under the culpability-
 
 164 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 
365 (“Imposing blame and punishment for anything other than intentional action and forbearance is both unfair 
and, in most cases, useless.”). 
 165 While some retributivists believe that we can also be culpable for negligently causing harm, others, 
like Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan, reject that view.  See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER 
FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY 69–71 (2009) (“We are not morally culpable for taking risks of which we 
are unaware.”). 
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plus-harm view, the punishment the assassin deserves depends on the bird’s 
flight path, even though the flight path is beyond the assassin’s awareness and 
control. 
While there is a vociferous debate about whether only culpability counts or 
whether harm counts, too,166 both views agree that subjective experience 
matters, at least indirectly, to our assessments of how blameworthy a person is.  
If one examines culpability plus harm, the actual results of criminal conduct 
are directly relevant to assessments of blameworthiness.  The more harm one 
causes, the more blameworthy he is.  Bad subjective experiences are at least 
part of the harm that criminals cause, and so such experiences affect their 
blameworthiness.  Even if Harsh and Harsher did not or could not predict the 
differential suffering of their victims, it wouldn’t matter: Harsh caused less 
harm than Harsher, and so, all else being equal, Harsh is less blameworthy. 
Suppose, however, that the culpability-plus-harm view is wrong.  Suppose 
instead that only culpability counts such that criminal blameworthiness really 
depends only on the amount of harm an offender purposely, knowingly, 
recklessly, or negligently risks causing.  If so, the subjective experience of a 
victim is not directly relevant to blameworthiness.  In that case, if Harsh and 
Harsher had no beliefs or intentions about the reactions of their seemingly 
identical victims, they would be equally blameworthy despite the fact that they 
caused different amounts of harm. 
Even on this view, however, the actual experiences of victims are likely to 
be indirectly relevant: When we assess the amount of harm an offender 
culpably caused or risked causing, our best evidence of the amount of harm he 
believed he would cause or risk causing often comes from examining the 
amount of harm he actually caused.  In real-life cases like that of Harsh and 
Harsher, we do not know precisely what offenders believed before they 
committed their crimes.  But as a general matter, robberies that are more 
vicious lead to more emotional harm.  So the amount of harm caused by an 
offense frequently tells us something, albeit indirectly, about the viciousness or 
callousness of an offender.167 
 
 166 I discussed the same issue earlier in the tort context.  See supra note 77. 
 167 Of course, if we ever develop reliable methods of lie detection, we could get more pertinent evidence 
by asking offenders about their intentions and beliefs at the time of their offenses.  Assuming that defendants 
still retain their Fifth Amendment rights not to incriminate themselves, however, we may still have to rely on 
indirect evidence of culpability by examining harms that offenders actually cause. 
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Therefore, regardless of one’s views on how harm impacts criminal 
wrongdoing, assessments of criminal blameworthiness depend either directly 
or indirectly on victims’ experiences.168  In the experiential present, it may 
simply be too difficult to distinguish people like Harsh and Harsher.  In the 
experiential future, however, such discriminations will be cheaper and easier to 
make.  Those who defend proportional punishment will have to use the 
technologies that become available or explain why they persist in knowingly 
punishing offenders disproportionally.169 
ii. Consequentialists 
So far, I have discussed the relationship between victim experiences and 
blameworthiness and argued that, no matter how one understands 
blameworthiness, subjective experience is usually relevant.  Not all 
punishment theorists agree with retributivists that punishment should be 
proportional to blameworthiness.  In particular, consequentialists believe that 
we punish in order to obtain good consequences.  We punish to deter crime, 
incapacitate dangerous people, and rehabilitate offenders.170  None of those 
consequences depend directly on offenders’ blameworthiness.  So one might 
reasonably ask whether subjective experience matters to consequentialists 
when deciding how much punishment is appropriate for an offender. 
The answer is that subjective experience matters to consequentialists for a 
number of reasons I address more directly in Part III.B.2.  For now, I note that 
even though blameworthiness is not directly part of the consequentialist 
calculus of the amount of punishment that an offender should receive, 
blameworthiness is relevant indirectly.  All else being equal, it is more 
blameworthy to intend or permit larger risks of harms than smaller ones.  
Furthermore, people who intend or permit larger risks of harm are usually also 
more dangerous.  So, even though consequentialists need not worry about 
 
 168 My view contrasts with Leo Katz’s in his book, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, 
AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 145–48 (1996).  Katz argues that the extent to which victim preferences 
are knowingly frustrated by criminals “need bear absolutely no relationship to the culpability of the 
perpetrator.”  Id. at 151.  Yet Katz admits that harm to victims is “one among several criteria of culpability.”  
Id.  So long as harm is one of the criteria of culpability, experiential harms (including the experience of having 
one’s preferences violated) must bear at least some relationship to perpetrator culpability when these 
experiential harms are foreseen by perpetrators (as they are in Katz’s examples). 
 169 Perhaps the best explanation for the failure of criminal law to carefully consider victim experiences is 
that the differential treatment of some crime victims can be corrected by the tort system.  It is usually quite 
difficult, however, to recover damages from criminals. 
 170 See C. L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 7–8 (1987). 
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blameworthiness per se, judgments of blameworthiness are indirectly relevant 
to consequentialist determinations about the need to deter and incapacitate 
dangerous people.  Harsher is not only more blameworthy than Harsh, he is 
also more dangerous. 
iii. How Sentencing Downplays Subjective Experience 
The bottom line is that when assessing how much punishment an offender 
should receive, victim experiences are generally relevant whether one is a 
retributivist or a consequentialist.  Nevertheless, our current sentencing 
regimes pay rather little attention to such experiences.  We undoubtedly have 
laws against theft, assault, and rape, in part, to discourage or punish the 
culpable inflictions of distress typically associated with those crimes.  And 
some statutes define criminal conduct, in part, by reference to victim 
experiences.171  But we give relatively little consideration to the amount of 
distress that offenders culpably cause or risk causing, and most criminal 
statutes make no explicit reference to victims’ experiences. 
Even statutes that seem to consider victim experiences do so at only the 
coarsest levels.  For example, we distinguish the crime of simple assault from 
the more serious crime of aggravated assault.  Aggravated assault typically 
refers to assaults with a deadly weapon or with the intent to inflict serious 
bodily harm.172  No doubt, aggravated assaults are more likely to cause victims 
more severe negative experiences.  But even among offenses deemed to be 
aggravated assaults, experiential harm to victims varies widely: 
In one case, for example, a state court upheld an aggravated assault 
conviction, finding (to no surprise) that the victim, who endured 
internal bleeding, two heart stoppages during emergency surgery, a 
collapsed lung, broken palate, fractured rib, and more than five 
months of rehabilitation following a brutal beating, had suffered 
“serious bodily injury.”  The same court upheld an aggravated assault 
conviction in another case, ruling that the loss of three teeth and a 
scarred lip also constituted “serious bodily injury.”173 
At sentencing, assessments of blameworthiness can be more fine-grained.  But 
even then, we group together conduct that causes quite different levels of 
 
 171 For example, California defines the crime of “stalking,” in part, by reference to conduct that “seriously 
alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes” the victim.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (West 2008). 
 172 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2) (1980). 
 173 Robert A. Mikos, “Eggshell” Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal Benefits of Shifting 
Crime, 105 MICH. L. REV. 307, 332–33 (2006) (footnotes omitted). 
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victim harm.  In the aggravated assault cases just described, the defendant who 
caused more harm to his victim got a suspended sentence while the defendant 
who caused much less harm received a three-year prison sentence.174 
Even rather detailed sentencing provisions probably downplay victim harm.  
For example, Texas grades theft crimes a “state jail felony” when they involve 
pecuniary losses between $1,500 and $20,000 and provides for a sentencing 
range of 180 days to two years in prison for such thefts.175  So there is a 
greater-than-tenfold range in the loss amount but only a fourfold range in the 
term of imprisonment.176  Even if the harms of theft depend on more than just 
the value of goods stolen, it may be difficult to punish offenders proportionally 
under this sentencing scheme.177 
More pertinently, victims experience their losses quite differently.  Though 
the Texas statute grades thefts between $1,500 and $20,000 the same way, the 
theft of $20,000 from Bill Gates is likely to upset him much less than the theft 
of $2,000 from a person with a small net worth.  The statute ignores the varied 
ways in which victims experience monetary losses.  Whatever we ultimately 
care about when assessing blameworthiness, the ultimate measure of harm 
cannot be denominated in dollars.  Dollars do not have intrinsic value; at best, 
they serve an instrumental role in helping us obtain ends that are intrinsically 
valuable.  Amounts of money stolen may serve as reasonably good proxies for 
harm, but when theorizing about crime or imagining a future with better 
measurement of experiential harms, we must remember that dollar-
denominated penalty systems are, at best, rough proxies for something else we 
truly care about. 
The fact that we examine victim harm at all implies that the severity of 
victim injuries is related at least to some degree to blameworthiness.  If victim 
harm were entirely unimportant, we might not even distinguish aggravated and 
ordinary assaults.  But we do make such distinctions because our best theories 
 
 174 Id. 
 175 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.35(a), 31.03(e)(4) (West 2003).  Those who commit state jail felonies 
may be fined up to $10,000.  Id. § 12.35(b). 
 176 Id. § 31.03(e)(1)–(7); see also Mikos, supra note 173, at 328–39. 
 177 The disparity between variation in harm caused and variation in sentence is even more readily apparent 
in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b) (2010) 
(advising judges to increase offense levels by 26 for thefts with losses over $100,000,000, 28 for losses over 
$200,000,000, and 30 for losses over $400,000,000).  Importantly, there are other harms associated with theft 
aside from pecuniary loss, and pecuniary loss is at best a rough proxy measure of harm.  I discuss pecuniary 
loss because that is the harm that theft statutes are most likely to reference, and it is easier to quantify than 
some other kinds of harms. 
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tell us that we should.  And once we acknowledge that victim experiences are 
relevant to punishment, we see that there are no good theoretical reasons for 
assessing victim harm only in the coarsest manner.  Granted, there are good 
reasons of cost and administrability for ignoring close differences in victim 
experiences.  Perhaps our current practices are appropriate in the experiential 
present.  But in the experiential future, the costs and administrative difficulties 
of measuring victim experiences will decrease, and we will have greater reason 
to pay more attention to such experiences than we do now. 
Importantly, I have not denied the possibility that crimes also cause non-
experiential harms.  Compare one victim who is raped and has terrible 
memories of the experience to another victim who is raped while unconscious 
and never experiences any ill effects from the crime nor discovers that the 
crime occurred.  The rapist of the first victim is probably more blameworthy 
than the rapist of the second victim.  The first caused, and likely intended to 
cause, much more experiential harm than the second.  Nevertheless, most 
would say that the second victim has also been seriously harmed by rape, even 
though the victim had no conscious experiences of the crime.  If all of the 
harms from crime were experiential, it would be difficult to explain the harms 
of raping unconscious victims. 
Yet I have not argued for the strong claim that experiential harms are the 
only harms that matter.  In Part I, I defended the much more modest claim that 
experiences are very important to us, even if our welfare depends on more than 
just experiences.  Similarly, even if bad things can happen to us that are non-
experiential, as the rape example seems to suggest, the negative experiences of 
crime are still a substantial part of the harm of most crimes. 
Given that experiential harms constitute at least a substantial part of all 
criminal harms, our current practices are difficult to justify.  We frequently 
treat offenders the same way, even when we know they caused or risked 
causing very different amounts of experiential harm; often, we ignore victim 
harm entirely.  Judges certainly do consider the extent of victim injuries at 
sentencing, but they do so with tremendous discretion and little obligation to 
gather and discuss victim-impact data.  In the experiential future, biological 
markers will provide information not only about whether a person committed a 
crime, but also about how much harm he caused.  We ought to use such 
technologies when they become reliable and cost-effective. 
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2. Punishment Severity 
Once we have decided how blameworthy or dangerous an offender is, we 
still must decide how long and how severely to punish him.  When discussing 
blameworthiness, I focused on how and why we might seek to better measure 
the experiences of crime victims.  When it comes to punishment, however, the 
law is not merely concerned with measuring bad experiences but also with 
inflicting those experiences on offenders.  If we want the suffering we cause to 
be justified, I will argue, we need to know how much suffering we are causing.  
So long as our punishments knowingly cause or risk causing substantial 
experiential harm, we must monitor the magnitude of those harms to make sure 
they do not exceed the amount justified by one’s preferred theory of 
punishment.178 
a. Our Mostly Non-Experiential Punishment Practices 
Both of the two principal ways in which theorists have sought to justify 
punishment require us to consider the experiences of those we punish.  As I 
noted earlier, most retributivists believe that we are justified in punishing 
offenders because they deserve it.  Offenders have done something wrong and 
should be punished in proportion to their blameworthiness.  Some retributivists 
believe that punishment should consist in the intentional infliction of bad 
experiences so as to give offenders what they deserve.179  Naturally, those who 
view punishment as intentionally dispensing bad experiences must consider the 
quantity of bad experiences that are dispensed. 
Other retributivists have a more abstract conception of how offenders 
should be punished, arguing that offenders should be deprived of certain 
liberties.180  Yet even these retributivists must still consider the amount of 
experiential suffering that liberty deprivations cause.  Even when punishment 
is not designed to inflict bad experiences, it nevertheless still causes bad 
experiences.  The causing of such severe, unpleasant experiences requires 
 
 178 I provide a much more detailed defense of this claim in Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 146. 
 179 See, e.g., JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 67 (1973) (“The principle that the wrongdoer 
deserves to suffer seems to accord with our deepest intuitions concerning justice.”); Herbert Fingarette, 
Punishment and Suffering, 50 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS’N 499, 499 (1977) (“I would like to 
expound a retributivist view of punishment—one that shows why the law must punish lawbreakers, must make 
them suffer, in a way fitting to the crime . . . .”); A. M. Quinton, On Punishment, 14 ANALYSIS 133, 137 
(1954) (stating that punishment is “infliction of suffering on the guilty”). 
 180 See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 163, at 10 (“[A] person is said to suffer punishment whenever he is legally 
deprived of some of the normal rights of a citizen . . . .”). 
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justification.  So even if we use the term “punishment” to refer to intentionally 
caused suffering or deprivation,181 we do not receive a free pass to inflict bad 
experiences without justification. 
To illustrate, imagine two offenders who are equally culpable and receive 
punishments that are alike in all of their objective features (for example, their 
cells are the same size, their food is the same, and their terms of imprisonment 
are equal).  Nevertheless, one of the prisoners, Sensitive, has a much worse 
experience of these conditions than does the other, Insensitive.182  Perhaps 
Sensitive has borderline claustrophobia, or perhaps he simply grew up living 
outdoors and has difficulty adjusting to the cramped, monotonous conditions of 
prison. 
Some retributivists may claim that Sensitive’s experience in prison is 
irrelevant because punishment consists of deprivations of liberty, and Sensitive 
and Insensitive are deprived of their liberties for the same period of time.  
Nevertheless, if retributivists hope to justify punishment, they cannot ignore 
prisoner experiences for one simple reason: We must justify not only our 
intentional inflictions of punishment but also our knowing inflictions of 
punishment.183  We knowingly inflict distress on Sensitive that we do not 
inflict on Insensitive when we deny Sensitive the opportunity to present 
evidence of his sensitivity and thereby reduce the duration or harshness of his 
confinement.  Assuming Insensitive receives the amount of punishment he 
deserves, any additional suffering we knowingly cause Sensitive lacks 
justification. 
To see why we must justify knowing inflictions of suffering, suppose a 
prison warden discovers that the water pipes in the prison have been 
contaminated with a substance that makes some prisoners extremely anxious 
and upset.184  All the prisoners drink the water but only half are sensitive to the 
contaminant.  The warden can easily turn a valve that will stop the 
contamination, but he elects not to.  If we need not justify our knowing 
 
 181 See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 4–5 (2d ed. 2008) (stating that a central feature of punishment is that it is “intentionally 
administered”). 
 182 Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 146, at 183. 
 183 They must also consider the fact that punishment severity depends on how a punishment changes 
offenders from their baseline conditions.  Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 105.  So, ideally, we would 
like to know about the baseline experiential states of Sensitive and Insensitive.  For simplicity, however, we 
can assume that Sensitive and Insensitive have identical baselines and ignore this complication. 
 184 Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 146, at 197–98. 
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inflictions of distress, then the warden’s refusal to act requires no justification.  
Surely, however, we have the intuition that the warden must justify his 
decision.  The fact that he merely knowingly inflicted distress is irrelevant.  
Knowing inflictions of substantial distress, like purposeful inflictions, require 
justification.185 
Though the warden’s behavior requires a justification, retributivists who 
believe that punishment consists of liberty deprivations have none to offer.  
Retributivists cannot appeal to the prisoners’ desert, since the prisoners are 
supposed to be satisfying their desert debt merely by being deprived of their 
liberties for the appointed period of time.  In fact, retributivists have nothing 
else to appeal to—at least those retributivists who, like most, believe that 
prison time should be proportional to desert.  Thus, whether retributivists 
believe that punishment is about inflicting distress or inflicting deprivations of 
liberty, they must take account of the amount of distress prisoners actually 
experience. 
In the warden example, the inmates made anxious by the contaminant 
suffer more than the others in ways that are easily foreseen.  So the warden 
needs to justify his refusal to rectify the problem.  Similarly, we must justify 
the harsher treatment of offenders like Sensitive who foreseeably face greater 
difficulties in prison for equally arbitrary reasons, like having grown up 
spending a lot of time outdoors.  After all, nothing about the warden example 
implies that the levels of anxiety and emotional trauma of the prisoners who 
receive contaminated water exceed the levels of anxiety and emotional trauma 
that we currently see everyday among sensitive prisoners. 
Even if prisoners were aware of their own sensitivities to prison before they 
committed their crimes, such awareness would not eliminate the 
disproportionality of their sentences.  We could punish murders by left-handed 
people with two years in prison and murders by right-handed people with 
twenty years in prison.  Offenders would have advance notice of their 
punishments, but their punishments would still violate common retributive 
commitments to proportionality.186   
The second major way that theorists have sought to justify punishment, as 
noted earlier, is on consequentialist grounds.  According to most 
 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 210–11. 
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consequentialists, punishment itself is a bad thing.187  Punishment may be 
justified, however, provided that it causes other good consequences.  For 
example, punishment can deter crime, incapacitate dangerous people, and 
maybe even rehabilitate offenders. 
Consequentialists must not only attend to prisoners’ anticipated 
punishment experiences but must also consider their actual punishment 
experiences because most consequentialists treat punishment itself as a prima 
facie bad thing.188  Consequentialists weigh the harms of punishment against 
the expected benefits.  Since the harms of punishment include its associated 
bad experiences, we cannot weigh costs and benefits unless we know how 
much distress punishment causes.  For example, the benefits from imprisoning 
Sensitive and Insensitive may be the same, but all else being equal, the 
consequentialist costs of imprisoning Sensitive are higher because he 
experiences more distress.  Failure to consider the ways offenders vary in their 
experiences of punishment will lead to incorrect consequentialist outcomes. 
Even though our leading theories of punishment, both retributivist and 
consequentialist, require us to consider offenders’ experiences, in fact, we 
usually ignore these experiences, at least officially.  While judges can and 
sometimes do take variation in offenders’ likely punishment experiences into 
account at sentencing, they rarely document such decisions.  Moreover, the 
influential Federal Sentencing Guidelines have long advised judges to ignore 
certain offender characteristics that might provide information about offenders’ 
future punishment experiences.189  Recent amendments to the guidelines have 
increased judges’ leeway to consider these characteristics, though they still 
substantially limit judges’ discretion.190 
 
 187 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 182 
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1789) (seeking to minimize the pain and suffering of punishment). 
 188 There are, however, nontraditional versions of consequentialism that, like retributivism, treat deserved 
punishment as a good thing, as discussed in MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 155–59 (1997), and in Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 815, 833–36 (2007). 
 189 For example, the 2009 Federal Sentencing Guidelines state that: “Age (including youth) is not 
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted,” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5H1.1 (2009); “[m]ental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a 
departure is warranted,” unless they affect culpability, id. § 5H1.3; and “[p]hysical condition or appearance, 
including physique, is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be warranted,” id. 
§ 5H1.4. 
 190 The 2010 Federal Sentencing Guidelines state that: “Age (including youth) may be relevant in 
determining whether a departure is warranted if considerations based on age, individually or in combination 
with other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical 
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Nevertheless, there are cases where courts recognize objective differences 
in prison conditions that surely affect prisoners’ subjective experiences.  For 
example, courts have reduced sentences for prisoners especially vulnerable to 
abuse in prison who, for their own safety, are likely to be placed in special 
administrative segregation units that are both objectively and subjectively 
harsher places to serve prison time.191 
In still rarer cases, courts may consider differences in experiences of 
confinement even absent blatantly different objective conditions of 
confinement.192  An Australian court, for example, appealed to an Aborigine’s 
likely subjective experience to justify giving him a shorter sentence than other 
Australians would receive.  According to the court: 
[I]n sentencing an Aborigine who has come from a deprived 
background or is otherwise disadvantaged by reason of social or 
economic factors or who has little experience of European ways, a 
lengthy term of imprisonment may be particularly, even unduly, 
harsh when served in an environment which is foreign to him and 
which is dominated by inmates and prison officers of European 
background with little understanding of his culture and society or his 
own personality.193 
 
cases covered by the guidelines.”  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 (2010).  Similar revisions 
were made to provisions covering other offender characteristics, including their “[m]ental and emotional 
conditions,” id. § 5H1.3, and “[p]hysical condition or appearance,” id. § 5H1.4. 
 191 See United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 211–13 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 166 F.3d 1202 (2d Cir. 
1998); see also United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (allowing extreme vulnerability 
to assault in prison as a ground for reducing a sentence but noting that the “vulnerability must be so extreme as 
to substantially affect the severity of confinement, such as where only solitary confinement can protect the 
defendant from abuse”). 
 192 For example, in United States v. McIlrath, 512 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2008), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the defendant’s forty-six month sentence for traveling across state 
lines to have sex with a minor, despite a psychologist’s testimony about the defendant’s poor coping skills and 
high likelihood of being targeted by other prison inmates.  Id. at 422.  Though the case was affirmed, the court 
at least acknowledged the potential relevance of the defendant’s sensitivity.  Writing for the panel, Judge 
Richard Posner stated that “[t]he defendant’s history and characteristics were relevant in possibly suggesting 
both that imprisonment would be a more severe punishment for him than for the average Internet sexual 
predator,” though “[a]s far as we know or the defendant’s lawyer or psychologist attempted to show, the 
average man who trolls for young girls in Internet chat rooms is no better adjusted than the defendant.”  Id. at 
423–24. 
 193 R v Stanley Edward Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58, 62–63 (Austl.).  The court’s statement that “a 
lengthy term of imprisonment may be particularly (even unduly) harsh” suggests (but does not conclusively 
demonstrate) that the court was considering the defendant’s likely experiences in prison. 
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Though the court restricted its claims to the circumstances of this particular 
offender, there are no obvious principles for considering subjective experience 
under just these sorts of circumstances. 
Were we to consider the subjective experience of prisoners, we would rely 
on many of the current and futuristic techniques that I discussed in the context 
of emotional distress.194  In the near future, we would consider expert 
assessments of distress, depression, panic, and anxiety, if we believe that such 
assessments can uncover malingerers.  In the experiential future, we may rely 
on technologies that examine structural or functional features of the brain to 
help assess an offender’s distress level or susceptibility to severe distress. 
Difficult as it would be to assess the subjective experience of prisoners, it 
would surely not be impossible.  After all, we at least purport to make such 
assessments every day in the tort system.  In cases of wrongful imprisonment, 
for example, we even purport to assess the negative experience of confinement 
in small spaces.195  Rather than hinging compensation merely on the number of 
hours or days that a plaintiff is falsely imprisoned, we purport to recognize the 
plaintiff’s individualized amount of suffering.  In a world with better methods 
of measuring suffering, there is no good reason, aside from cost, to measure 
individualized experiences in tort law but not in criminal law. 
b. The Special Case of Lethal Injection 
There is one punishment context where courts have taken seriously the 
anticipated experiences of those about to be punished.  Over the last century, 
reformers have sought more humane forms of execution.  In the years leading 
up to the twentieth century, “hanging was the nearly universal form of 
execution,”196 until it was gradually replaced by electrocution under the “well-
grounded belief that electrocution is less painful and more humane than 
hanging.”197  Over the last thirty years, most states with a death penalty began 
 
 194 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 195 See, e.g., Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 125 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The plaintiff is entitled to 
compensation for loss of time, for physical discomfort or inconvenience, and for any resulting physical illness 
or injury to health.  Since the injury is in large part a mental one, the plaintiff is entitled to damages for mental 
suffering, humiliation, and the like.” (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 140, § 11, at 48) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 196 State v. Frampton, 627 P.2d 922, 934 (Wash. 1981); see also Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008). 
 197 Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 185 (1915). 
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to rely on lethal injection as a still safer, less painful alternative to 
electrocution.198 
Debate continues to swirl around lethal injection as death row inmates 
argue in court that lethal injection protocols risk causing them excruciating 
pain.  These protocols usually include the administration of three drugs.  The 
first, sodium thiopental, anesthetizes the person.  The second, pancuronium 
bromide, paralyzes him.  And the third, potassium chloride, stops his heart.199  
If an executionee is not properly anesthetized during the first part of the lethal 
injection process, he will subsequently be injected with the paralytic agent that 
will make him physiologically incapable of communicating his pain during the 
rest of the execution.  Deborah Denno describes concerns about use of the 
paralytic agent pancuronium bromide: 
Without adequate anesthesia, pancuronium can cause an inmate 
excruciating pain and suffering because the inmate slowly suffocates 
from the drug’s effects while paralyzed and unable to cry out.  Such 
agony is increased all the more when executioners inject the third 
drug, potassium chloride, which creates an intense and unbearable 
burning.  There is agreement that if the [anesthetic] sodium thiopental 
is ineffective, it would be unconscionable to inject the second and 
third drugs into a conscious person.  A key issue in litigation is 
whether prison officials and executioners can determine if an inmate 
is aware and in torment because the pancuronium is such a powerful 
mask of emotions.200 
The lethal injection debate is about the risk of causing inmates excruciating 
pain, and new technologies to measure the experiences of executionees have 
been brought to bear.201  In 2006, Willie Brown, Jr. claimed that North 
Carolina’s lethal injection protocol was constitutionally defective.  In the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Brown argued “that 
the State will use an inadequate protocol for anesthesia as a precursor to 
carrying out his death sentence, and that as a result he faces an unacceptable 
and unnecessary risk of suffering excruciating pain during his execution in 
 
 198 Baze, 553 U.S. at 42–44. 
 199 Deborah W. Denno, Introduction, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 701, 702 (2008) (introducing the Fordham 
Urban Law Journal’s symposium issue on “The Lethal Injection Debate: Law and Science”). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Robert Steinbrook, New Technology, Old Dilemma—Monitoring EEG Activity During Executions, 354 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2525 (2006); see also Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine 
Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49 (2007). 
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violation of the Eighth Amendment.”202  The district court decided that there 
were “substantial questions as to whether North Carolina’s execution protocol 
creates an undue risk of excessive pain.”203  Brown’s execution was permitted 
to proceed provided execution personnel would be “present and accessible to 
[him] throughout the execution . . . with sufficient medical training to ensure 
that [he] is in all respects unconscious prior to and at the time of the 
administration of any pancuronium bromide or potassium chloride.”204 
To satisfy its obligation to the court, the state agreed to have Brown’s 
execution monitored by a nurse and a physician using a device called a 
bispectral index monitor.205  A bispectral index monitor uses 
electroencephalography to monitor electrical activity in a subject’s brain.206  
The device is supposed to provide anesthesiologists with a measure of 
anesthetic depth to help them determine if patients’ anesthesia is working 
properly.207  If it accomplished its intended purpose in the execution context, it 
would help those engaged in the lethal injection process to determine whether 
an executionee has received the appropriate level of anesthesia such that he 
will not be in pain during execution.  In Brown’s case, the court allowed his 
execution to proceed based, in part, on the state’s assertion “that a licensed 
registered nurse and a licensed physician will be positioned in the observation 
room where they can both observe and read the values of the BIS monitor.”208 
In some respects, the technological monitoring of executions could be 
viewed as a step toward our experiential future.  While the state takes a life, the 
state’s agents monitor the executionee’s level of awareness and, by 
implication, his level of pain.  A retributivist who believes that loss of life (and 
loss of life alone) is an appropriate, proportional punishment for a death row 
inmate should support the idea of monitoring lethal injections.  Any pain from 
the injection itself would be disproportional suffering for such a retributivist, at 
least in a world where we have relatively easy ways of knowing the level of an 
executionee’s pain. 
 
 202 Brown v. Beck, 445 F.3d 752, 753 (4th Cir. 2006) (Michael, J., dissenting). 
 203 Brown v. Beck, No. 5:06CT3018, 2006 WL 3914717, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006). 
 204 Id. 
 205 Steinbrook, supra note 201, at 2527. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Andrea Weigl, Doc’s Execution Role: “Be Present,” NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 30, 
2007, at A1 (quoting Judge Malcolm J. Howard’s April 17, 2006 order) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Nevertheless, the physician present at Brown’s execution apparently did not monitor the machine, possibly in 
violation of the court’s order.  Id. 
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Similarly, in a world where anesthetic depth can be cost-effectively 
monitored, consequentialists should also support monitoring the pain of lethal 
injection.  The pain of execution with insufficient anesthesia would be 
excruciating, yet would have no deterrent, incapacitative, or rehabilitative 
effect on the executed offender.  Painful executions might deter others from 
committing death-penalty-eligible crimes, but that is an argument for reducing 
anesthesia, not for declining to monitor whatever pain we do cause. 
If Willie Brown’s case was a step toward our experiential future, however, 
it was at most a small one.  In a recent Supreme Court case, Baze v. Rees, the 
Court rejected the need for bispectral index monitoring.209  In that case, two 
death row inmates claimed that Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol constituted 
“cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment “because of the 
risk that the protocol’s terms might not be properly followed, resulting in 
significant pain.”210  Among their claims, they argued that Kentucky’s 
execution protocol should require states to use technologies, like a bispectral 
index monitor, to measure anesthetic depth.211  Ultimately, the Court, in a 
three-Justice plurality opinion, wrote that Kentucky’s lethal injection 
procedure did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.212  The plurality 
noted that Kentucky already had sufficient precautions to ensure delivery of 
the appropriate amount of anesthesia and noted that the bispectral index 
monitor had yet to be endorsed by the medical community as a whole.213  The 
plurality also noted that requiring use of a device like a bispectral index 
monitor would effectively halt executions because the device is supposed to be 
read by anesthesiologists, yet anesthesiologists are prohibited by Kentucky law 
and by their code of conduct from participating in executions.214 
Even though the Court in Baze determined that the Constitution does not 
require more stringent monitoring of the lethal injection protocol in Kentucky 
and in those states with a “substantially similar” protocol,215 most of the Court 
seemed to agree that the Constitution limits the acceptable level of pain that 
 
 209 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1526–27 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
 210 Id. at 1526. 
 211 Id. at 1536. 
 212 Id. at 1538. 
 213 Id. at 1536 (citing Task Force on Intraoperative Awareness, Am. Soc’y of Anesthesiologists, Practice 
Advisory for Intraoperative Awareness and Brain Function Monitoring, 104 ANESTHESIOLOGY 847, 855 
(2006)). 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 1537. 
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can be risked when engaging in lethal injection.216  Had a better, cheaper 
technology been available to monitor the subjective experience of those being 
executed, one that did not require a doctor’s supervision, the case may have 
come out differently. 
The claim that we must better monitor the experiences of those who are 
punished may not be a popular one.  Many find it distasteful to hook people up 
to machines to see how they are experiencing the unpleasant things we do to 
them.  While such aversion is understandable, it must be resisted because it has 
the wrong target.  We may understandably be troubled by the state’s 
purposeful or knowing inflictions of harm on offenders.  But once we decide as 
a society to permit such inflictions, we are obligated to monitor the amount of 
harm inflicted, at least when we can do so cost effectively.  We must 
distinguish our understandable distaste for the nasty business of making people 
suffer from our moral obligation to make sure that people are not suffering 
excessively. 
3. Interrogation and Torture 
In the nasty business of intentionally making people suffer, there is no 
activity more vicious than torture.  Torture has been prominently defined in 
terms of the infliction of bad experiences.  The United Nations Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment prohibits “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” by a state actor.217  
Similarly, federal criminal law in the United States prohibits torture, defined as 
“an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain 
or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his 
 
 216 See id. at 1532 (stating the plurality’s view that, absent a legitimate penological justification for some 
method of execution, condemned prisoners can challenge it by presenting another method that is “feasible, 
readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain”); id. at 1563 (Breyer, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with Justice Ginsburg that the Court should review claims that a 
method of execution is unconstitutional by considering “whether the method creates an untoward, readily 
avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary suffering”); id. at 1568 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (voicing 
agreement “with petitioners and the plurality that the degree of risk, magnitude of pain, and availability of 
alternatives must be considered” when evaluating the constitutionality of a method of execution). 
 217 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
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custody or physical control.”218  These provisions make clear that the 
intentional infliction of negative experiences constitutes the central harm that 
torture prohibitions are trying to prevent. 
Earlier, I noted how technology may help us determine whether a crime has 
occurred.  Torture provides another example.  New technologies can help us 
determine whether an alleged torture victim has actually been tortured.  One 
research group recently used magnetoencephalography, a technique similar to 
electroencephalography, to examine the long-term effects of torture on 
victims’ brain waves.219  The researchers found dysfunctional brain wave 
activity in those who experienced torture that was not present in healthy 
subjects.220  Research like this could someday lead to technologies that support 
or cast doubt on claims that a person was severely tortured and thereby provide 
helpful evidence in war-crime proceedings, asylum applications, tort suits, and 
other venues. 
Perhaps the most difficult challenge when it comes to torture, however, is 
determining when a so-called enhanced interrogation technique causes so 
much distress that its intentional use should be deemed torture.  One way to 
protect interrogatees from torture is to prohibit interrogation techniques that 
are likely to cause extreme pain or suffering.  For example, when a person is 
waterboarded, he is strapped down on an incline, with his feet elevated above 
his head, while water is poured over his face to give him the sensation that he 
is drowning.221  Prohibiting waterboarding may be one good method of 
prohibiting behavior likely to lead to extreme pain or suffering. 
Importantly, however, a ban on a particular interrogation technique is still a 
very rough proxy approach.  Whether or not waterboarding causes legally 
impermissible pain and suffering depends on how we expect particular 
interrogatees to experience waterboarding, and their reactions will vary to 
some degree.  An interrogatee who developed post-traumatic stress disorder 
from having nearly drowned in a swimming pool as a child will react 
differently to waterboarding than will a United States Marine who has 
 
 218 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006).  Interestingly, the prohibition’s exception of “pain or suffering incidental 
to lawful sanctions” seems to recognize, as I argued earlier, that criminal punishment intentionally or at least 
foreseeably causes bad experiences.  Id. 
 219 William J. Ray et al., Decoupling Neural Networks from Reality: Dissociative Experiences in Torture 
Victims Are Reflected in Abnormal Brain Waves in Left Frontal Cortex, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 825 (2006). 
 220 Id. at 827. 
 221 Kermit Roosevelt III, Detention and Interrogation in the Post-9/11 World, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 6 
n.35 (2008). 
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advanced training in how to resist waterboarding interrogations.  In other 
words, the public debate about torture focuses on whether some technique, in 
the abstract, is permissible, when what really matters depends on (an 
interrogator’s beliefs about) an interrogatee’s experiential responses.  Those 
responses depend on the relationship between the interrogatee and the way he 
is treated, not just the method of interrogation in the abstract. 
Given the inadequacy of current technology to assess experiences, we may 
need to prohibit broad categories of enhanced interrogation like waterboarding.  
We may also fear that those tasked with measuring distress levels will simply 
rubber stamp torture (though if people can be dishonest about measuring 
distress, they can be dishonest about what categories of interrogation they 
use).222 
But if we had sufficiently reliable technologies to measure acute distress, 
we could further protect interrogatees by stipulating maximum levels of 
distress an interrogatee is permitted to experience.223  In this regard, our 
experiential future may be close at hand.  It is almost certainly easier to 
measure acute distress than chronic distress.  We already have some biological 
markers of acute distress, like pulse, blood pressure, levels of stress hormones, 
galvanic skin response, and others.224 
As noted above, the idea that we should measure the acute distress of 
interrogatees seems disturbing.  The harm caused by inflicting some amount of 
distress, however, is far more troublesome than the comparatively slight 
invasion caused by measuring it.  If we are permitted to engage in some 
behavior that is likely to cause distress, then we are permitted to measure the 
distress we cause.  The reason that the measurement of distress seems so 
 
 222 Jurisdictions might also adopt procedures to ensure that the party that measures distress is independent 
of the party that conducts the interrogation. 
 223 Importantly, it is not sufficient to merely protect interrogatees’ health, for such protections may still 
permit excessively distressful treatment.  In Public Committee Against Torture v. Prime Minister, for example, 
Israel’s High Court of Justice discussed directives issued by the country’s General Security Service that 
described permissible occasions for interrogators to use harsh tactics, including an especially distressing tactic 
known as “shaking.”  HCJ 5100/94 IsrSC 567, 577–78 [1999].  According to the Court, the directives provided 
that before shaking, “the investigator must first provide an evaluation of the suspect’s health and ensure that no 
harm comes to him or her.”  Id. at 578.  But even if the directives protect interrogatees against long-term health 
risks, interrogatees may still suffer impermissible, intense physical or emotional distress during shaking. 
 224 See, e.g., Germaine M. Buck Louis et al., Stress Reduces Conception Probabilities Across the Fertile 
Window: Evidence in Support of Relaxation, FERTILITY & STERILITY 1–2 (2010) (using salivary cortisol and α-
amylase to measure stress levels); Simpson, supra note 67, at 491 (noting that autonomic arousal has been 
measured using “pulse rate, respiration, blood pressure, and sweating (variously known as the galvanic skin 
response [GSR], skin conductance response [SCR], or electrodermal activity)”). 
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troubling is that it forces us to palpably recognize our participation in the nasty 
business of intentionally making others suffer.  Measuring distress is not the 
principal act of harm, however.  Measurement merely forces us to confront and 
better quantify what is always happening when a person is subjected to 
enhanced forms of interrogation.  By way of rough analogy, consider the sport 
of boxing, where participants intentionally cause each other substantial 
suffering.  There may be good arguments for banning the sport entirely.  But 
once we permit the activity to proceed, we affirmatively ought to have an 
official who is trained to end a fight when a boxer’s suffering becomes too 
dangerous or distressing. 
Of course, if one believes that a particular instance of intentionally caused 
suffering is illegal or immoral, then one should also oppose measuring its 
severity when the act of measuring is a form of aiding or participating in the 
infliction.  Many people believe that some psychologists who aided the CIA 
during post-9/11 interrogations should be criminally punished or at least 
professionally disciplined for their assistance.225  Such judgments make sense 
if these psychologists participated in or helped plan acts of torture.  But we 
should not feel the same way about psychologists who attend interrogations 
when their participation does not aid or abet torture.  So, for example, if a 
police department hires a psychologist to monitor its interrogations—and there 
is no reason to think that officers plan to use more intense interrogations as a 
result—the act of monitoring is less likely to be troublesome.  It may even be a 
commendable safety precaution. 
C. The Experiential Gap Between Tort Law and Criminal Law 
Tort law pays much more attention to bad experiences than criminal law 
does.  In tort law, experiences matter, both in terms of actual doctrine and our 
justifications of doctrine.  True, it is difficult to identify physiological markers 
of current or past experiences, so it is not surprising that tort law often resorts 
to rough proxy measurements (by considering, for example, whether plaintiffs 
were in a zone of danger or had physical manifestations of distress).  These 
inexact proxies for bad experiences reduce the likelihood that litigants will 
 
 225 See Leonard S. Rubenstein & Stephen N. Xenakis, Doctors Without Morals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
2010, at A27 (arguing that government agencies, state licensing boards, or professional medical societies 
should investigate doctors and psychologists who may have participated in or authorized acts of torture of 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere); Scott Shane, 2 U.S. Architects of Harsh Tactics in 9/11’s Wake, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2009, at A1 (noting that two psychologists who assisted the CIA’s interrogation program 
after the attacks on September 11, 2001, may face criminal charges). 
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invent or exaggerate their symptoms.  But at least in tort contexts, the law 
purports to care about individualized measurements of harm.  If a person is 
falsely imprisoned, he can sue for the amount of harm that he experienced.  
There is no general formula that converts objective measurements, like the 
number of hours falsely imprisoned and the dimensions of confinement, into 
amounts of compensation.226 
Though we frequently fail to recognize it, experiences also matter in 
criminal contexts.  Technologies better able to assess experience can help us 
decide when a crime occurred, how blameworthy the perpetrator was, and how 
much punishment he should receive.  If we can measure the harms of false 
imprisonment to individual tort plaintiffs (who have incentives to lie), then we 
can calculate the severity of confinement experienced by particular prisoners.  
Moreover, we usually say that criminal defendants are entitled to more process 
than tort plaintiffs, not less.  While we presumably don’t want to spend the 
money to make such assessments of prisoners, we should stop pretending that 
rough subjective assessments are impossible: they just cost more than we are 
willing to spend. 
D. Why the Experiential Future Matters Now 
To sum up the current state of technology, a lot of research has suggested 
methods of making better inferences about subjective experience.  Much of 
this research, however, tells us something about people in general and is not 
yet sufficiently powerful or reliable to use in individual cases.  In order to be 
useful in the courtroom, we need to continue to refine and test technologies to 
enable us to make reasonably accurate inferences about the experiences of 
particular individuals, even when they have incentives to lie. 
But even if many of the technologies I discuss never pan out, others that 
have yet to be discovered will certainly prove useful.  In all likelihood, we will 
eventually combine a wide variety of technologies to help us make more 
confident assessments of subjective experience than we can with any single 
technology. 
When we look at current research from a bird’s eye view, a picture of our 
experiential future emerges.  The picture interests us, in part, simply because 
we want to know what the future will be like.  There are four principal reasons, 
 
 226 See Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 105, at 1574. 
KOLBER GALLEYSFINAL 4/5/2011  10:52 AM 
2011] THE EXPERIENTIAL FUTURE OF THE LAW 649 
however, why our experiential future matters today, even though the most 
dramatic technological advances are still in the future. 
First, many of the technologies discussed raise important issues about the 
privacy of our thoughts and experiences.227  Our privacy interests in our 
physical and emotional pain are not especially strong to the extent that we 
already require litigants to submit to invasive medical examinations in order to 
prove their claims.228  And in contexts where the government causes suffering, 
like punishment and enhanced interrogation, the invasion of privacy required 
to measure experiences is small relative to the invasiveness of the suffering 
itself. 
In other contexts, however, privacy interests in our experiences may be 
quite substantial and controversial.  For example, researchers have made 
progress in identifying the neural correlates of racial bias229 and sexual arousal 
and orientation.230  Sexually aroused pedophiles show a different pattern of 
brain activation than do sexually aroused nonpedophiles.231  Thus, we have 
reason to begin thinking about the privacy protections that will apply to such 
technologies. 
Moreover, privacy concerns can arise long before new technologies are 
developed.  As I noted earlier, the mere possibility that we will develop 
accurate lie detectors in the future should change our behavior today because 
we might be asked about our current behavior on some distant, future 
occasion.232  Precisely how such technologies should change our behavior 
depends, in part, on whatever future privacy protections we think we will have.  
So our beliefs about the privacy protections accompanying future technologies 
may affect our behavior even today. 
 
 227 See generally Kolber, Pain Detection, supra note 1, at 451–55. 
 228 FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a)–(b) (“[A] party whose mental or physical condition . . . is in controversy [may be 
ordered] to submit to a physical or mental examination . . . on motion for good cause . . . .”). 
 229 See, e.g., William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the Processing of Black and 
White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 806 (2004); Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of 
Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729 (2000); Mary E. Wheeler 
& Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice: Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype 
Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56 (2005). 
 230 See, e.g., Bruce A. Arnow et al., Brain Activation and Sexual Arousal in Healthy, Heterosexual Males, 
125 BRAIN 1014 (2002); Jorge Ponseti et al., A Functional Endophenotype for Sexual Orientation in Humans, 
33 NEUROIMAGE 825 (2006). 
 231 Martin Walter et al., Pedophilia Is Linked to Reduced Activation in Hypothalamus and Lateral 
Prefrontal Cortex During Visual Erotic Stimulation, 62 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 698 (2007). 
 232 See supra Part II.B.2. 
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Second, by looking toward the experiential future, we can help guide 
research into new technologies in ways that will benefit the legal system.  For 
example, I noted that quite a bit of research looks at experiential differences in 
groups of people, but far less identifies experiential differences among 
individuals.  Identifying individual differences is more expensive and more 
difficult technologically.  Moreover, scientists have less incentive to develop 
individualized measurements than lawyers do.  An ambitious neuroscientist 
might search for the region of the brain generally associated with some 
experience and then move on to another issue, rather than seek to refine the 
methodology and statistical power of an experiment to look for differences at 
the individual level that can be used in court.  The legal profession can help 
identify applications of new technologies that would be especially beneficial. 
The third principal reason our experiential future matters today is that our 
failure to direct the development of the experiential future may delay the 
development of technologies that are quite valuable from a societal perspective 
but are politically unpopular and unlikely to garner the interests of the research 
community.  For example, I described how epigenetic evidence may someday 
give us reason to believe that a person was not a childhood victim of severe or 
repeated neglect or abuse.233  I noted that such tools may only provide 
evidence asymmetrically: they may tell us that an alleged perpetrator is 
innocent, even if they are incapable of telling us that an actual perpetrator is 
guilty.  Such a technology could be enormously valuable to society if it 
reduces the risk that innocent people are erroneously sent to prison.  
Nevertheless, because alleged child abusers are not politically well organized, 
they are unlikely to lobby for funds or form large foundations that can 
underwrite expensive research. 
Neuroscience research is particularly expensive.  It costs over $500 per 
hour to scan one subject in an fMRI machine.234  Since researchers depend 
heavily on grant money, some important but unpopular research may be 
underfunded.  By drawing attention to possible forensic uses of new 
technologies, we can hope to steer the course of research in promising (but 
likely overlooked) directions. 
Finally, and most importantly, our experiential future matters today 
because it illuminates how we often hide our need for better information about 
 
 233 See supra Part III.B.1.a.i. 
 234 See, e.g., fMRI Lab Policies, MICH. FMRI LAB, http://www.umich.edu/~fmri/policies.html (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2011). 
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experiences by using rough proxies for those experiences.  For example, we 
determine whether a person was tortured by examining the techniques that 
were used on the alleged victim rather than the individualized amount of 
distress he experienced (or was expected to experience).  Because the law 
developed over hundreds of years without good technologies to assess 
experience, objective approaches to the law predominate, in ways that are often 
unseen and unconsidered.  By considering our experiential future, we gain a 
better appreciation of the importance of subjective experience to the law even 
today. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that, even though experiences are critically important to our 
lives and to our best theories of what the law should consider, in many 
respects, the law ignores our experiences or uses very rough proxies to take 
them into consideration. 
Among the many claims in this Article, I have argued that, in the 
experiential future: (1) the tort system should develop more objective units to 
describe pain and other forms of suffering; (2) worker’s compensation and 
other administrative compensation schemes should arguably consider actual 
amounts of pain and suffering rather than merely consulting objectively 
defined compensation schedules; (3) the law of deceptive advertising should at 
least recognize that placebo pain relief is real relief, even if there are still good 
policy reasons to prohibit advertising that leaves a false impression about a 
product’s efficacy relative to a placebo; (4) claims for negligent or intentional 
infliction of emotional distress should rely less on doctrines that limit 
recoveries to the most extreme cases; (5) the criminal justice system should 
continue to develop new methods of assessing whether crimes occurred and the 
nature of the experiential harms they caused; (6) sentencing should pay greater 
attention to the amount that offenders suffer as a result of punishment, not only 
in the context of executions, but in general; and (7) policies against torture 
should not rely solely on banning particular categories of interrogation but 
should also consider the amount of experiential distress a particular 
interrogatee undergoes. 
This list provides just a short sample of the many ways in which the legal 
system should change in the experiential future.  While we still have to wait for 
practical, reliable methods of assessing the full range of human experiences, 
we will not have to wait long for some of these technologies, in primitive form, 
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to be tested in court.  In the meantime, we should more carefully scrutinize 
those areas of the law where our best theories require us to pay more attention 
to subjective experience. 
